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There is contention surrounding two major questions in regard to voting behavior in
American politics. First, are political advertisements efficacious? Second, do partisans
interpret political information in a different way than those who do not identify with a
political bias — that is, do partisans engage in partisan-motivated reasoning? As billions
of dollars each American presidential election cycle are spent, and fierce competition
pervades the elections, shedding light on these two questions is more essential than ever.
This project focuses on coupling these questions together to investigate if individuals
who identify with a political party reason in a partisan-motivated manner in response to
political advertisements. Utilizing a novel survey instrument and originally designed
political advertisements featuring the candidates of the 2020 Presidential election, I
surveyed over 900 individuals to discern if partisan-motivated reasoning was operative.
I found three key results. First, partisan-motivated reasoning was utilized by those
who identified as Republican or Democratic, but not for those who did not identify as
being a partisan of one of the major political parties. Second, Republicans and Democrats
reason in distinct, separate manners. Republicans did not modify their responses after
exposure to partisan-conforming political advertisements (Trump-source advertisements)
but did modify their responses after receiving partisan-nonconforming political
advertisments (Biden-source advertisements). Oppositely, Democrats did modify their
vi
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responses after exposure to partisan-conforming political advertisements (Biden-source
advertisements) but did not modify their responses after receiving partisan-
nonconforming political advertisements (Trump-source advertisements). Third, and more
broadly, political advertisements are indeed effective; over 85% of individuals changed
their first responses after exposure to the political advertisements. Moreover, across
treatments, more than 31% of individuals updated their first answers and submitted
updated responses as the same statistic presented in the advertisement. In sum, this thesis
helps to elucidate an understanding of how partisans understand political information,
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The dawn rose on the first modern election in the United States of America’s history in
1800. The candidates: Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. With this formative election, a
feature evolved that Americans have come to expect from a modern presidential
campaign. A vicious campaign against Jefferson was launched by the Federalists.
Distasteful attacks included: the accusation of atheism, the character of “an ‘impractical’
dreamer’”, the “broad charge of disrespect to Washington”, and the indictment of “a
revolutionary wrecker of the most violent type”1. In return, unsavory claims in the form
of published word and advertising elucidated John Adams’ supposed character2.
Ye will judge without regard to the prattle of a president, the prattle of that strange
compound of ignorance and ferocity, of deceit and weakness; without regard to
that hideous hermaphroditical character, which has neither the force and firmness
of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.
The election of 1800 set the precedent of public political advertisements that are intended
to persuade the audience of not only the opposing candidate’s character faults, but their
poor political records as well.
Just over a century later, America would inch even closer to the modern election.
Leading up to the presidential election of 1924, the radio was employed for the first time
to broadcast political advertisements and listeners were able to hear the politician speak
via the broadcast; soon they were introduced to soundbites3. Presidential advertisements
3David G. Clark, "Radio in Presidential Campaigns: The Early Years (1924–1932)", Journal of
Broadcasting 6, no. 3 (1962): 229-238. See also: Michael X. Delli Carpini, “Radio's Political Past”, Media
Studies Journal 7, no. 3 (1993), 23-36.
2James Callender, The Prospect Before Us (Richmond, Virginia: Printed for the author and sold by M.
Jones, S. Pleasants, Jun., and J. Lyon, 1800-1801), v. 2 pt. 2, 57.
1Charles O. Lerche, "Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Case Study in the Political Smear", The William
and Mary Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1948): 470.
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made a historic breakthrough yet again as the first political advertisement aired and
Eisenhower was able to “answer” Americans through their television sets4. In 1964, the
advertising terrain was revolutionized with “the ad that changed American politics”5. Of
course, this is the “Daisy” advertisement produced by the Johnson campaign6.
The scene: Birds chirping. A little girl is plucking the petals off a daisy, counting
without a care in an idyllic field. As she reaches “ten” a harsh voice-over with that
identifiable ‘60s twang begins an ominous countdown with a slow zoom-in on the girl’s
eye. When the countdown reaches zero, a nuclear bomb detonates with a spectacular
mushroom cloud. Johnson’s voice is heard. “‘These are the stakes: To make a world in
which all of God's children can live, or to go into the darkness. We must either love each
other, or we must die’”. A narrator closes out the advertisement, “‘The stakes are too high
for you to stay home’”.
Figure One: Daisy Girl.
6The following quotes and image are taken from “Peace Little Girl (Daisy)," Johnson, 1964,
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964#.
5Robert Mann, Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed
American Politics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).
4Stephen C. Wood, "Television's First Political Spot Ad Campaign: Eisenhower Answers America",
Presidential Studies Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1990): 265-283.
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Importantly, this advertisement never mentions Johnson’s opponent, Goldwater. Yet, fear
and humanity were tapped into in an unprecedented manner. Negative advertising, “the
emotional political attack ad … visceral, terrifying, and risky”7 was born. Though this
advertising is incorrectly attributed to Johnson securing the ‘64 win (Johnson would have
won easily without this advertisement), this does not mean “that the Daisy Girl spot was
not a pivotal and historic moment in American political history”8, rather “it asked viewers
to interpret the scene through the framework of their own experience”9 leading to the
Daisy advertisement “usher[ing] political advertising into the modern era”10.
The next generation of political advertising was brought with the 44th President,
Barack Obama. Obama and his campaign are credited with harnessing the ability to
directly reach people via social media and online methods11. The Social Media President:
Barack Obama and the Politics of Digital Engagement by Jain, Barris and Katz identifies
three methods of interaction with citizens via social media: the ability to collect public
opinions via “soliciting public sentiment”, sharing information with citizens that informs
in a biased manner, and gathering public opinions to provide an “opportunity to influence
policy”12.
12Jenn Burleson Mackay, "The Social Media President: Barack Obama and the Politics of Digital
Engagement: Review", Presidential Studies Quarterly 45, no.1 (2015): 212.
11James Everett Katz, Michael Barris, and Anshul Jain, The Social Media President: Barack Obama and the
Politics of Digital Engagement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
10Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed American Politics,
111.
9Allan M. Winkler, "Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed
American Politics by Robert Mann (Review)", Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 264.
8Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed American Politics,
102.
7Robert Mann, “How the ‘Daisy’ Ad Changed Everything About Political Advertising”, Smithsonian
Magazine, 13 April 2016.
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Just two terms later, President Donald Trump masterfully exploited the
invasiveness of social media, notably Twitter, and became America’s “140-character
president”13 (indicative of Twitter’s then 140-character limit on a single tweet). Trump
effectively engaged not only potential voters and partisans of the Republican party, but
also directly fought, blamed and responded to those who were dismayed by his candidacy
and did not agree with his policy positions. Social media responds eagerly to this type of
outlandish, persistent rhetoric. This rhetoric meets the “selection criteria of the media”14
in turn, triggering journalists to report more heavily on the social media posts and online
engagement, heightening visibility and publicization for the candidate.
The most recent epoch of political advertising began as COVID-19 met the 2020
Presidential election. COVID-19 was first reported to the World Health Organization
(WHO) on 31 December 2019, with the infection stemming from Wuhan, China15. Since
the outbreak in China, the disease has become a worldwide crisis. More than 68 million
cases have been contracted worldwide and more than 1.5 million individuals who
contracted COVID-19 have died16. “The novel COVID‐19 is highly contagious and is
16“COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins
University”, Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, 2020,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. Statistics accurate at time of writing.
15“Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Situation Report-1”, World Health Organization, 21 January 2020,
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf.
14Gianpietro Mazzoleni, “Populism and the Media”, in Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Eds.),
Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, (New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillian, 2008).
13Matthew Ingram, “The 140-Character President”, Columbia Journalism Review, Fall 2017,
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/trump-twitter-tweets-president.php.
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transmitted mostly through respiratory droplets. But, whether its transmission can be
forwarded by touching a surface is uncertain”17.
Consequently, political campaigning and advertising was completely overhauled
preceding the 2020 election. No longer could candidates engage in “kissing babies and
shaking hands”. Online political advertisements became more consequential than ever
before as people all over the nation were sequestered in their homes, engrossed with their
phones and computers, watching through a screen American political drama unfold and
an international pandemic grip the world.
The 2020 election was the most expensive in history; about $11 billion was spent
by October 202018. Open Secrets reported that this election was “more than 50 percent
pricier than the 2016 contest when adjusting for inflation”19. Analyzing the 2020 election
online political advertising activity in toto: $2.3 billion was spent on 14 million
advertisements from 96 thousand individual advertisers20. The campaign to elect Joe
Biden spent nearly $250 million dollars on online political advertisements21; just over
$100 million dollars of this total sum was spent on Google advertisements. The campaign
to elect Donald Trump spent more than $300 million dollars on online political
21“Online Ad Spending for Joe Biden”, Open Secrets, 2020,
https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/joe-biden/online-ad-spending?id=N00001669. This
number (250 million) is the combined amount that the candidate spent on online advertisements (about 192
million) and organizations supporting Biden’s election via buying online advertisements (about 57 million).
The data collection ended 1 November 2020.
20“Online Political Ad Spending”, Open Secrets, 4 December 2020. These figures are from “Facebook
starting on January 1, 2020 and data for Google starting on May 27, 2018”, collected via Open Secrets.
19Ibid.
18“2020 Election to Near $11 Billion in Total Spending, Smashing Records”, Open Secrets, 1 October 2020.
17Ranjan K. Mohapatra et al., "The Recent Challenges of Highly Contagious COVID‐19, Causing
Respiratory Infections: Symptoms, Diagnosis, Transmission, Possible Vaccines, Animal Models, and
Immunotherapy", Chemical Biology & Drug Design 96, no.5 (2020): 1194.
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advertisements22; nearly $140 million dollars of this total sum was spent on Google
advertisements.
In the 2016 election, Hillary Clinton’s campaign spent about $33 million dollars
on digital media expenditures23. Outside groups supporting Clinton’s election spent about
$18 million dollars on digital media expenditures24. Donald Trump’s campaign spent
about $88 million dollars on digital media expenditures25. Outside groups supporting
Trump’s election spent about $156 million dollars on digital media expenditures26. In just
four years, the difference in online political advertising for presidential campaigns is
staggering. Comparing the Democratic candidates, Joe Biden outspent Hillary Clinton by
$159 million dollars27. Examining Donald Trump’s 2016 and 2020 election, Donald
Trump increased his online political spending by $181 million dollars28. This enormous
28This statistic is calculated in the following way. Trump’s personal campaign spent $269 million dollars on
online political advertisements in 2020. Trump’s personal campaign spent $88 million dollars on digital
27This statistic is calculated in the following way. Biden’s personal campaign spent $192 million dollars on
online political advertisements. Clinton’s personal campaign spent $33 million dollars on digital media, this
is a good comparison statistic to online political advertisements. Thus, there is a $159 million dollar
difference between the two campaigns.
26Ibid. This statistic is featured on page 416 of the article, in Table 4 - “Outside Group Expenditures by
Media Type on Behalf of Presidential Candidates, 2015–2016 Reporting Period”.
25Ibid. This statistic is featured on page 414 of the article, in Table 2 - “Presidential Expenditures by Media
Type, 2015–2016 Reporting Period”.
24Ibid. This statistic is featured on page 416 of the article, in Table 4 - “Outside Group Expenditures by
Media Type on Behalf of Presidential Candidates, 2015–2016 Reporting Period”.
23Christine B. Williams and Girish J. Gulati, "Digital Advertising Expenditures in the 2016 Presidential
Election", Social Science Computer Review 36, no. 4 (2018): 414. This statistic was calculated by the
authors from “the candidate disbursements and independent expenditures files for 2012 and 2016 collected
by the FEC”. The authors classified an advertisement as including “the terms digital, Internet, or e-mail in
the ‘purpose’ field of the FEC report filings. If the field included multiple purposes but also specified
digital, Internet, or e-mail, we still assigned the entry to the new media category. If, however, these entries
were specifically for expenditures, such as Internet or e-mail services, we considered them to be similar to
electric, telephone, cable TV, and other utilities services and did not classify them as digital media
expenditures”. Specifically, this statistic is featured on page 414 of the article, in Table 2 - “Presidential
Expenditures by Media Type, 2015–2016 Reporting Period”.
22“Online Ad Spending for Donald Trump”, Open Secrets, 2020,
https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/donald-trump/online-ad-spending?id=N00023864. This
number (300 million) is the combined amount that the candidate spent on online advertisements (about 269
million) and organizations supporting Trump’s re-election via buying online advertisements (about 33
million). The data collection ended 1 November 2020.
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increase in online political advertising during the 2020 election may be attributable to the
fact that more individuals were home and utilizing their devices during the COVID-19
breakout, leaving political candidates less opportunity to interact in person with potential
voters. However, this effect of increased advertisements and spending may be due to the
established efficacy of online political advertisements. Online political advertisements are
relatively inexpensive and are powerful due to the ability to target individuals whose
interests and searches are related to the campaign. Additionally, a political advertisement
has the capability to rouse individuals of differing partisanships, so if an individual is
exposed to an advertisement that does not conform with his partisanship, the individual
may still be affected.
There is a threat to the current landscape of political advertising. Facebook has
claimed in the past that the company does not have the right to dictate or fact-check
political advertising “on the basis that private sector companies should not be the ‘arbiter
of truth’”29. However, amid pressure from critics and the Senate to limit disinformation
and organizations that propagate violence30, Facebook has instituted change surrounding
political advertising. Facebook blocked all “political and issue-based advertising after the
polls close on Nov.3 for an undetermined length of time”31. This policy “initially kicked
off hundreds of pre-approved digital ads, leaving campaigns, including both presidential
31Ibid.
30Mike Isaac, “Facebook Widens Ban on Political Ads as Alarm Rises Over Election”, The New York Times,
17 November 2020.
29Hannah Murphy, “Facebook and Google Quietly Extend Bans On Political Advertising”, Financial Times,
11 November 2020.
media in 2016, this is a good comparison statistic to online political advertisements. Thus, there is a $181
million dollar difference between the two campaigns.
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campaigns, with blocked ads for several days”32. This has incited fear that “the platform
may ban political ads altogether”33. In mid-December of 2020, Facebook allowed
“political ads for the Georgia runoff elections starting Wednesday but [continued to]
maintain a broader temporary blackout for U.S. ads about social issues, elections or
politics as part of its efforts to curb misinformation”34. However starting 6 January 2021
Facebook has once more curtailed all political advertisements, this is in line with the
“existing nationwide social issues, electoral or political ads pause”35.
Google briefly copied Facebook’s policy of banning political advertisements
starting on 3 November. Google claimed that this was to “limit the potential for ads to
increase confusion post-election”36. “The ban [covered] any ad that mention[ed] a
candidate, a political party or an election, among other election-related content”37. In
mid-December of 2020, Google lifted the ban on political advertisements38. Google
requires that “advertisers [are] verified, and observe our [Google’s] policies and
applicable laws”39.
39“Google Transparency Report: Political Advertising in the United States”, 20 February 2021,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/region/US?hl=en&spend_by_geo=state:;p:6&lu=spend
_by_geo. For more information on requirements for political advertising in the United States on Google’s
platform, please see: “Advertising Policies Help: About Verification For Election Advertising in the United
States”, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/9002729.
38Megan Graham, “Google Will Lift Its Ban On Political Ads Thursday”, CNBC, 9 December 2020.
37Ibid.
36Rachel Lerman, “Google Says It Will Ban Political Ads Following Election”, The Washington Post, 27
October 2020.
35“About Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics”, Facebook.com,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/167836590566506?id=288762101909005.
34Emily Glazer and Patience Haggin, “Facebook to Allow Political Ads for Georgia Runoffs”, The Wall
Street Journal, 15 Decemeber 2020.
33Ibid.
32Elena Schneider, “Facebook Extends Political Ad Ban as Georgia Senate Runoffs Heat Up”, Politico, 11
November 2020.
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Twitter is also adopting a similar stance on political advertisements. Twitter
announced it will “no longer allow political advertisements on its digital platform.
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey defined political ads as those sponsored by candidates or that
discussed political issues; advertisements that discuss elections, candidates, parties, and
overtly political content would be prohibited”40. In addition, Twitter now labels Tweets
“containing synthetic and manipulated media” regarding both politics and COVID-1941.
“Depending on the propensity for harm and type of misleading information, warnings
may also be applied to a Tweet”42.
42Ibid.
41Yoel Roth and Nick Pickles, “Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information”, Twitter.com, 11 May
2020,
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-misleading-information.html.




The future of political communication is dependent on understanding the viability of
online political advertisements. To study the efficacy of online political advertisements, I
will put forth four principal research questions. The most fundamental question to move
forward with subsequent research is, (1) are political advertisements effective — do
online political advertisements inform? This question is essential to examine first, as
there is discourse regarding the value of political advertisements. If indeed political
advertisements are effective at informing individuals (inducing learning or influencing an
update of prior beliefs/opinions), (2) which individuals are more motivated to update
their priors or accept information presented in the advertisements? This second question
is crucial, with billions of dollars being invested in political advertisements with
potentially powerful effects, targeting the right people with the right advertisements can
mean the difference of winning an election or not.
Next, (3) if online political advertisements do indeed inform, do individuals who
view the advertisement take what the advertisement states at face value, or do they
interpret the information in light of previously learned and internalized information? This
question speaks to how individuals reason, either in a Bayesian or in a motivated manner.
If individuals update in a partisan-motivated manner, (4) does the partisanship of the
political advertisement prejudice how an individual, with their own partisanship,
interprets the political advertisement? This question seeks to analyze how individuals
reason after exposure to political advertisements when presented with partisan-
conforming or nonconforming advertisements with biased information.
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III. The Efficacy of Online Advertisements
In order to understand the existing knowledge that contributes to understanding the
political efficacy of online advertisements, I will conduct a literature review to connect
my research questions to the existing body of academic research. I will first engage with
elucidating the academic work surrounding motivated reasoning, focusing on
partisan-motivated reasoning. Following, I will examine the literature regarding the
effectiveness of political advertisements, attempting to understand which individuals are
most influenced by political advertisements, and with what content presented in the
advertisements. Finally, I will consider the literature surrounding how partisans
understand partisan-biased information, especially as presented in political
advertisements.
Before the literature review is conducted, it is essential to put forth definitions that
will be utilized throughout the remainder of this paper. First, partisan-motivated
reasoning follows Thaler’s definition43, which updates Kahan’s framework44. Thaler
defines motivated reasoning succinctly: “agents update from information using a
modified Bayes’ rule. They act as if they put appropriate weights on their prior and the
signal likelihood, but receive an additional signal that puts more weight on beliefs that
they are more motivated to hold”. In terms of receiving political information, “a subject
who engages in motivated reasoning will trust the news more if it sends a message that
44Dan Kahan, “The Politically Motivated Reasoning Paradigm, Part 1: What Politically Motivated
Reasoning Is and How to Measure It”, in Stephen Kosslyn, Robert A. Scott, and Marlis C. Buchmann
(Eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and
Linkable Resource (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2016).
43Michael Thaler, “The ‘Fake News Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in
News”, Working Paper, February 2021, 8.
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supports what he is more motivated to believe. If he engages in politically- motivated
reasoning, he will assess messages that align with beliefs of his political party (Pro-Party
news) to be more truthful, while assessing messages that misalign (Anti-Party news) to be
less truthful”45. Contrastingly, Bayesian reasoning is defined by Fairfield and Charman46
as: “simply a process of updating our views about which hypothesis best explains the …
outcome of interest as we learn additional information”. Zaks adds to this definition, “the
process of continuous updating in light of evidence”47. In sum, partisan-motivated
reasoning, in this thesis, involves an individual being exposed to political information and
updating based on the information viewed, weighted against their prior political biases
and beliefs. Bayesian updating, in this thesis, is when an individual is exposed to political
information and updates purely based on what information is presented in a rational
manner; emotions and past political biases largely do not factor into an individual’s
decision to update their beliefs.
It is also important to define partisanship as it is utilized in this paper. I build my
definition on Campbell’s classic, The American Voter48. Partisanship is the “cluster of
precepts and feelings that make up the popular image of the parties and candidates
[which] are ultimately of interest for their effect on what the electorate does”. In this
thesis, partisanship will be defined as the political party the participant identified with in
the demographic questioning portion of the survey. I contend that party identification is
48Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), 64.
47Sherry Zaks, "Updating Bayesian(s): A Critical Evaluation of Bayesian Process Tracing", Political
Analysis (2021): 60.
46Tasha Fairfield and Anderw Charman, “A Dialogue with the Data: The Bayesian Foundations of Iterative
Research in Qualitative Social Science”, Perspectives on Politics 17(1): 158.
45Ibid. Information in parentheses author’s own.
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representative of partisanship and can also speak to underlying political ideologies, and
potentially past voting behavior of participants.
14
IV. Motivated Reasoning — Partisan-Motivated Reasoning
It is crucial to understand if receiving political information prior to an election influences
voter attitude and beliefs regarding not only the candidate for whom they received an
advertisement for, but also if there are updated beliefs regarding the opponent. In May of
2011, authors Kendall, Nannicini and Trebbi conducted “a large-scale controlled trial in
collaboration with the reelection campaign of an Italian incumbent mayor … [the
authors] administered (randomized) messages about the candidate's valence or
ideology”49. The methodological setup included a survey ten days prior to the election “to
measure priors and demographic characteristics”, an informational treatment that
consisted of a phone call or a flyer with different political messaging on it, and a survey
conducted once again with the same voters a day after the election “to measure posteriors
and (self-declared) vote choices”50. The authors found significant results that lend
themselves to not rejecting the null hypothesis, that political advertisements have no
effect on interpretation of the candidate, the opponent or the policy topic. The authors
found that a valence policy message that informed about the candidate51:
was effective in changing votes [the informational policy message] along both the
valence and ideological dimension had large effects on voters' beliefs, moving
both first and second moments of the belief distributions for the two main
candidates. Indeed, campaign information affected not only voters' beliefs about
the candidate originating the message, but also their beliefs about the opponent.
51Ibid., 323.
50Ibid., 338. Brackets the authors’ own.
49Chad Kendall, Tommaso Nannicini, and Francesco Trebbi, "How Do Voters Respond to Information?
Evidence from a Randomized Campaign", The American Economic Review 105, no. 1 (2015): 322.
Parentheses the authors’ own.
15
Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus analyze the relationship between political
advertisements and the effect on voters’ beliefs, and if the effect is mediated by strength
of partisanship; this is a good extension of Kendall et al.’s findings . When studying the
opinion formation and frame of individuals interpreting policies, the authors found that
“polarization [of both political elites and of the policy issues] intensifies the impact of
party endorsements on opinions, decreases the impact of substantive information and …
stimulates greater confidence in those—less substantively grounded—opinions”52. This
applies to political messaging and advertisements; when elites present and advertise
policy positions tied to the political party, individuals interpret this as a cue to also
polarize on the issue. Advertisements are an adept heuristic of informing voters of
partisan polarization and can encourage viewers to refine their priors. Thus, using their
political party as a cue, “partisans always evaluated the frames endorsed by their party as
significantly stronger, regardless of the policy issue”53; consequently, motivated
reasoning is induced upon evaluation of the policy topic and political figure.
One must examine the question of how motivated reasoning is employed and
wielded politically. In 1990, Kunda54 argued that motivated reasoning is a common and
significant cognitive process that affects how individuals understand information
presented. Individuals look for heuristics in order to make, what they believe, is the most
accurate interpretation based on their prior beliefs and assumptions — individuals will
54Ziva Kunda, "The Case for Motivated Reasoning", Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 3 (1990): 483.
53Ibid., 72. Italics the authors’ own.
52James N. Druckman, Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus, "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public
Opinion Formation", The American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 57.
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weight this presentation of the information more heavily when the information is in line
with their inveterate partisan attitudes. Kunda established that:
people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to
construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a
dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster
up the evidence necessary to support it.
Bolsen, Druckman and Cook build off of Kunda’s developments and specifically examine
partisan motivated reasoning. The authors put forth that55
partisan motivated reasoning (i.e., directional goals aimed at protecting one’s
partisan identification) is likely to occur when one is primed to pay particular
attention to being consistent with his/her partisan identity. Partisan identity
certainly plays a critical role in public opinion formation and directional
reasoning is likely often driven by an individual’s desire to be loyal and consistent
with one’s own party and maximize differences with the out-party.
Importantly, Bolsen et al. advance that partisan-motivated reasoning effects can explain
the level of support for policies. The authors submit that there are two “critical aspects of
the reality of politics — the source of political information and the motivation underlying
individuals’ opinion formation process”56.
The motivation underlying individuals’ opinion formation process can further be
understood by examining partisan identity. Those who hold their political identity as an
important factor of self will support the policy positions and politicians that support their
partisanship to a greater extent than those with lower levels of adherence to their
56Ibid., 252. Italics the authors’ own.
55Toby Bolsen, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook, "The Influence of Partisan Motivated
Reasoning on Public Opinion", Political Behavior 36, no. 2 (2013): 237. The information in the parentheses
is the authors’ own.
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partisanship; thus encouraging partisan motivated reasoning. This internalization of
partisanship that plays a large explanatory role in motivated reasoning upon exposure to
political information can be explicated by the Partisan Model of voting behavior, a subset
of the Michigan model of voting behavior57. The following are principles of the Partisan
Model; this thesis is predicated on the assumptions derived from the Partisan Model.
First, partisanship, or party identification, is usually acquired from one’s parents during
early childhood socialization. Furthermore, partisanship develops and strengthens with
age, but does not change direction. In terms of partisan loyalty, voters who consider
themselves Democrats seldom become Republicans (or vice versa) although weak
identifiers may become strong identifiers as they continue to vote their party preferences.
When considering voting, partisanship influences attitude toward issues; voters who
know the position their party took on a particular issue generally agree with that position.
This leads to voting predictability, in the absence of overwhelming short term forces,
voters vote for the candidate of the party with whom they identify. Moreover,
partisanship is not only remarkably stable over an individual’s lifetime, it is the single
best predictor of an individual’s vote decision.
I contend that the principles of the Partisan Model are the foundation of partisan-
motivated reasoning and will inform about the efficacy of political advertisements. This
position is analogous to Downs’ theory: “Parties cannot adopt identical ideologies,
because they must create enough product differentiation to make their output
57All information regarding the Michigan model in this paragraph is from: Marthe Chandler, "Models of
Voting Behavior in Survey Research", Synthese (Dordrecht) 76, no. 1 (1988): 30-31.
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distinguishable from that of their rivals, so as to entice voters to the polls”58. Thus,
political information must delineate the Republican and Democrat position clearly so that
an individual can: draw on partisanship as a heuristic (Partisan Model), identify the
information in a binary manner as being of their supported political party or not, and
utilize partisan motivated reasoning to come to a conclusion about political information
presented59.
Understanding how political parties and their campaign advertisements exploit
this ingrained heuristic can elucidate how advertisements prime partisan viewers and
crystalize political predisposition. Leeper and Slothuus argue that political parties have
the ability to powerfully shape political reasoning. The authors argue that “parties
structure and provide the alternatives—policies and candidates—that citizens can choose
among [and] parties mobilize citizens and tell them how they should understand the
political choices before them and, by implication, what political predispositions should be
applied and how”60. Political parties are able to harness the monopoly on the
interpretation of policy by employing systematic simplification of choice: us versus them,
Democrat versus Republican61. Consequently, the reasoning individuals engage in when
developing preferences for policy is simplified, and motivated reasoning — the goal
being to stay consistent with your party and partisanship — is utilized when interpreting
61This argument is interpreted from: Paul M. Sniderman, “Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political
Reasoning” in Arthur Lupia , Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of Reason
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
60Thomas J. Leeper and Rune Slothuus, "Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion
Formation", Political Psychology 35, no. S1 (2014): 133.
59This sequence assumes that an individual identifies not only with the political party but also interprets
their political bias to be an important element of “self”.
58Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", The Journal of Political
Economy 65, no. 2 (1957): 142.
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information presented and forming a bias on the policy. This relationship between
partisanship and a policy’s ability to inform is cultivated by a strong association between
the “who” and the “what”62. As Carmines and Kuklinski explicate: “Each message alone
— the ‘who’ and the ‘what’ — has limited value, but together they represent a potentially
useful and readily interpretable piece of information”63.
To examine my second research question, what characteristics of an individual
affects an individual to change their first answer?, I hypothesize that those individuals
who are more committed to a political party will be more likely to be motivated to change
their first answer and by a larger amount than those who do not identify with these
characteristics. I believe that this is due to a life-long process of developing a political
identity and understanding political information through this lens. I contend that these
partisan “cues” build on each other to encourage individuals to reason with the
information they are exposed to and thus modify their answers accordingly. Those who
do not strongly identify with the partisan cues will still be motivated to update their first
answers, just by a smaller magnitude.
The partisan significance hypothesis: Those who identify with the political party
of the advertisement source will update their first answers by a larger amount
compared to those who do not identify with the political partisanship (the party).
Similarly, I hypothesize that political cues will be more salient than demographic controls
when understanding how an individual updates their beliefs. I hypothesize that this is
63Ibid., 254.
62Edward G. Carmines and James H. Kuklinski, “Incentives, Opportunities, and the Logic of Public
Opinion in American Political Representation” in J. A. Ferejohn and J. H. Kuklinski (Eds.), Information
and Democratic Processes (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
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because when viewing a political advertisement, individuals will rely on partisan source
heuristics to quickly form an opinion and modify their answer dependent on the source of
the advertisement.
The “partisanship is king” hypothesis: Partisanship cues are the most salient
indications of an impetus to modify a participant’s first answer.
21
V. Effectiveness of Political Advertisements
The literature on partisan motivated reasoning discussed contends that individuals, who
identify with a political party, utilize political advertisements (drawing on their long-ago
established party loyalty) to make political decisions and judgement straightforwardly,
based on political cues from the advertisements. However, there is discourse in the
political advertising literature surrounding the actual value and long-term effects of the
political advertisements. Consequently, it is essential to examine if political
advertisements are observed, and if they inform and persuade.
First, it is important to explore if political advertisements induce learning and
prompt a development or confirmation of political sentiment. In an early study comparing
political advertisements on television to political advertisements online (in the 2004
election), Lee Kaid and Postelnicu found that: “John Kerry’s ads were more successful in
raising his image and learning scores when viewed on the Web with access to additional
information sources”64. Moreover, the authors found that those who were exposed to
internet political advertisements “admitted that they learned more about the campaign
than the people exposed to the television format”65. At the time the authors concluded
that the internet advertisements enhanced knowledge about both candidates and issues,
but the authors caution that this may be due to individuals using the internet to
specifically seek out political information. Now that political advertisements utilize
cookies, and advertisements can be found on nearly every website, perhaps individuals
are becoming desensitized and do not learn as much as their predecessors viewing
65Ibid., 274.
64Lynda Lee Kaid and Monica Postelnicu, "Political Advertising in the 2004 Election", The American
Behavioral Scientist (Beverly Hills) 49, no. 2 (2005): 265.
22
political advertisements on the internet. However, the converse may be true and perhaps
people are learning more from political advertisements and the campaign in general due
to the vast amount of inundating advertisements on the internet. This effect may be
further encouraged due to the ease and accessibility of following up with the information
reported in an online political advertisement with a quick internet search. Householder et
al. found that “an increase in the volume of political advertising aired on a given day was
positively correlated with a same-day spike in related online searches”66; the authors
equate an online search for political information as a cue that political learning does
result from exposure to advertisements. Consequently, it may be likely that greater
exposure to political advertisements online inspires extended political learning.
It is also valuable to examine if political advertisements are more efficacious
when a viewer identifies a strong partisanship bias. Franz and Ridout employed a survey
in 2004 that examined the effects of advertisements regarding the presidential race and
Senatorial contests; these advertisements were on the medium of television. The purpose
of the study was to explore if exposure to advertisements influenced “candidate
evaluation and vote choice [and, furthermore, if there is] an impact that varies depending
on the characteristics of the viewer”67. The model the authors utilize contends “messages
inconsistent with one’s partisan identification—that is, counter-attitudinal messages—are
67Michael M. Franz and Travis N. Ridout, "Does Political Advertising Persuade?", Political Behavior 29,
no. 4 (2007): 466.
66Elizabeth Housholder, Brenda R. Watson and Susan LoRusso, "Does Political Advertising Lead to Online
Information Seeking? A Real-World Test Using Google Search Data”, Journal of Broadcasting &
Electronic Media 62, no. 2 (2018): 348. Similar conclusions are found by Dhavan V. Shah et al.,
“Campaign Ads, Online Messaging, and Participation: Extending the Communication Mediation Model",
Journal of Communication 57, no. 4 (2007): 695. Shah et al. found that “Exposure to [online] political
advertising has direct effects on information seeking via mass media, especially newspaper and television
news use but also online news”.
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actively resisted, while messages consistent with one’s partisan identification are readily
accepted”68. The authors also maintain that those who are more politically sophisticated
are more equipped to “understand better the political implications of a new [divergent to
their beliefs] message”69. This may be understood as: those who are politically
sophisticated (informed) partisans, when exposed to an advertisement supporting a
candidate of a differing partisanship, will be better able to “resist those messages
inconsistent with their beliefs”70. Thus the authors put forth hypotheses: “persuasive
effects will differ depending on the partisanship of the individual who is exposed to
advertising”, “independents … will be influenced by exposure to advertising from both
candidates”, those who are exposed to advertisements confirming their partisanship will
increase support but are least likely to persuade in a different manner due to previously
established support for the candidate and the party’s messages — this will “bring
partisans home”71. The authors find their hypotheses confirmed. To emphasize two main
findings, though the hypotheses put forth were indeed confirmed, individuals of both
partisanships were “influenced by messages received from both sides” and the effects of
the political advertisements were “more widespread, affecting independents, weak
partisans and even some strong partisans”72. This is beneficial in understanding the
efficacy of online political advertisements. If the advertisements are affecting others that
72"Does Political Advertising Persuade?”, 485.
71This notion of coming home is noted in Ridout and Franz’ article. Partisanship “bringing partisans home”,
or eliciting political support to vote for the party, was originally put forth in: Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard
Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential





the campaign did not initially target, the campaign is receiving greater utility and value
from the advertisements, bolstering the argument that political advertisements are a
successful investment.
Moreover, there is evidence that greater exposure to political advertisements
encourages persuasion of potential voters. Huber and Arceneaux observed a specific
group of individuals “living in nonbattleground states during the 2000 presidential
election [who are exposed to] either high levels or one-sided barrages of campaign
advertisements simply because they resided in a media market adjoining a competitive
state”73; again, these advertisements are on television. The authors found varying results.
Though the authors did not find significant support for advertising informing and
mobilizing, the authors champion advertisements as an influential and crucial element to
“persuade potential voters”74.
To address if online political advertisements encourage viewers to observe and
interact with the advertisement, a study by Vargo and Hopp examined political
advertisements that were published on the platforms of Facebook and Instagram by “the
Russian-based Internet Research Agency”75. The study found that when advertisements
arouse emotional responses, the advertising CTR (clickthrough rate — which measures
how often an advertisement was viewed or the number of “impressions” an advertisement
received) increased. In fact, “additional analyses showed that the advertisements were
75Chris J. Vargo and Toby Hopp, "Fear, Anger, and Political Advertisement Engagement: A Computational
Case Study of Russian-Linked Facebook and Instagram Content", Journalism & Mass Communication
Quarterly 97, no. 3 (2020): 743.
74Ibid., 975.
73Gregory A. Huber and Kevin Arceneaux, "Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising",
American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 4 (2007): 957.
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engaged with at rates that exceed industry benchmarks, and that clickthrough rates
increased over time”76. The authors understand this significant and unprecedented result
as supporting the contention that online political advertisements are efficacious, and
worthwhile.
Specifically examining if political advertisements are recalled and thus effective,
Walsh et al. conducted a study of online political advertisements in online video games to
examine if individuals were aware of the advertisements and ensuing attitudes of the
politician77. In this study, the authors compared the advertisements that President
Obama’s campaign published in 2008 to the gaming site and advertisements for corporate
brands. The results are exciting; the Obama advertisements “had the highest recall rate
with 78.9% of the respondents correctly recalling the ad”78. However, the Obama
advertisement did not develop any new positive emotions toward the then-candidate
Obama, in fact participants responded that they were opposed to political advertising in
online video games. I contend that though no new positive emotions were elicited from
viewing this advertisement in the context of a video game, the viewer of the
advertisement did demonstrate high recall rates, and this recollection is arguably more
crucial than the approval of an in-game political advertisement. This recollection
78Ibid., 135. Similar results were found in Nelson’s 2002 study: “The participants [sic] brand awareness
levels were measured immediately after playing the game and then again 5 months after they originally
played the game. When their awareness levels were measured following game play 25–30 % of the brands
were recalled, while 10–15 % were recalled after the 5 month delay”. The quote is from the source: Patrick
Walsh, Galen Clavio, Susan Mullane and Warren Whisenant, “Brand Awareness and Attitudes Towards
Political Advertisements in Sport Video Games", Public Organization Review 14, no. 2 (2014): 128-129.
The Nelson 2002 study source is: Michelle R. Nelson, “Recall of Brand Placements in Computer/Video
Games”, Journal of Advertising Research 42, no. 2 (2002): 80-92.
77Patrick Walsh, Galen Clavio, Susan Mullane and Warren Whisenant, "Brand Awareness and Attitudes




potentially can translate to later political engagement online by searching for additional
information about the candidate and policy positions, which may lead to the individual
becoming a future voter.
A political advertisement has the capability to influence political discourse
outside of the individuals it targets online.  Moving from online video games to Twitter
and newspapers, Kim et al. study the relationship of political advertisements to influence
the agendas of Tweets and newspapers79. The study examined the 2012 election,
analyzing nearly 30,000 tweets and 349 articles about Obama and about 18,000 tweets
and 317 articles about Romney. 166 television political advertisements were analyzed80.
The findings showed81
the issue and attribute agendas of each candidate's political advertisements were
positively correlated with the agendas of newspapers and tweets. In addition, the
issue and attribute agendas of newspapers about each candidate were positively
correlated with the agendas of tweets. More important, our findings demonstrated
that the explanatory powers of the first- and second-level intermedia agenda
setting influence differ by the candidate and the media.
This study supports that political advertisements are salient in elections and wield
influence on the resulting campaign. Importantly, though this study analyzes television
advertisements, it shows the importance of resultant online political media and publicity
in the forms of articles, new advertisements and word-of-mouth. Political advertisements
are the root of influencing, biasing and directing the agenda and perception of the
81Ibid., 4563.
80Ibid., 4557.
79Yeojin Kim et al., "First and Second Levels of Intermedia Agenda Setting: Political Advertising,
Newspapers, and Twitter during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election", International Journal of
Communication (Online), 2016, 4550–4569.
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campaign. Advertisements are a powerful signal that informs voters and the media what
issues are important and the campaign’s position.
In light of the literature, and in addressing my first research question, are online
political advertisements informative?, I hypothesize that most of the participants in my
study will update their answer regardless of partisanship, due to the introduction of new
political information via political advertisement. Advertisements will induce a change in
any participant due to engagement with an individuals’ partisan leanings, for example, an
individual may change their first answer because they agree with and trust the source, or
an individual may change their first answer because they do not agree with or trust the
source. Regardless, I believe that political advertisements will be efficacious in inducing
a change in an individual’s first answer due to partisan motivated reasoning.
The efficacy of advertisement hypothesis: Political advertisements will be
effective in inducing a reformation of understanding and affect a change in
participants’ first answer, regardless of partisanship.
28
VI. Relationship Between Partisanship and Understanding of Information
First, we must beg the question of the relationship between partisanship and the
understanding of information. The common narrative is that all media is politicized and
heavily partisan, and this influences individuals’ perception of the information and their
disposition to accept the information. Clayton et al. argue that instead, the information
presented is the key factor in influencing an individual’s belief in the veracity of the
information; the implication here is that people are susceptible to information that is
presented from what they perceive to be a viable information source82. Clayton et al.
summarize this point succinctly: “content appears to ‘trump’ source, partisanship, and
ideology among American consumers of the mass media”83. This may relate to political
advertisements due to the veracity of information presented, individuals may be more
likely to believe the information is correct when viewing a political advertisement,
however individuals can then choose how to understand that information and update their
prior beliefs.
Therefore, it is crucial to examine how users of online media understand and
interact with political content and advertisements. The question becomes: is false political
information viewed still successful at inducing learning and interest in the subject? To
look into this, a study was conducted on Facebook that analyzed how individuals shared
political information. It was shown that conservatives were far more likely “to share
articles from fake news domains, which in 2016 were largely pro-Trump in orientation,
83Ibid., 140.
82Katherine Clayton et al., “Partisan Motivated Reasoning and Misinformation in the Media: Is News From
Ideologically Uncongenial Sources More Suspicious?”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 20, no. 3
(2019): 129- 142.
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than liberals or moderates”84. This gives credence to the notion that political information
secures attention, especially in the medium of online political media. As for consumption
of fake news, age plays a significant role in how many articles are read, even controlling
for partisanship, as “users over 65 shared nearly seven times as many articles from fake
news domains as the youngest age group”85. Consequently, marketing and campaign
managers may proceed with a confirmation that political content is efficacious and target
users who are most susceptible to consumption; this bolsters the notion behind political
media managers spending billions on political advertising, there is an effect of
encouraging an interest in the political content and a potential updating of beliefs in
subsets of individuals. Importantly, the site where the information is presented may have
an effect on what media is consumed. In a BuzzFeed News Analysis of political
information on Facebook, analysts found that “in the final three months of the US
presidential campaign, the top-performing fake election news stories on Facebook
generated more engagement than the top stories from major news outlets such as the New
York Times, Washington Post, Huffington Post, [and] NBC News”86. Furthermore, this
86Craig Silverman, “This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News
On Facebook”, BuzzFeed News, 16 November 2016. The methodology behind this analysis: The
“BuzzFeed-based list began with 30 domains identified by that site’s reporting as purveyors of intentionally
false election-related stories generating the most Facebook engagement. To do this, the journalists, led by
Craig Silverman, used keywords and existing lists combined with the analytics service BuzzSumo. To
ensure that our analysis stayed clear of websites that could be construed as partisan or hyperpartisan (rather
than intentionally or systematically factually inaccurate), we additionally filtered out domains identified as
hard news by a supervised learning classifier developed by Bakshy et al. (23). The nearly 500 hard news
domains encompass a wide range of news and opinion websites, both mainstream and niche. The classifier
was trained on the text features of roughly 7 million web pages shared on Facebook over a 6-month period
by U.S. users, with training labels for hard and soft news generated using bootstrapped keyword searches
on the URLs. Once matches to this list of hard news domains were removed (for example, Breitbart.com),
we were left with 21 domains”. Information in parentheses and usage of italics are from the source.
85Ibid., 1.
84Andrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler and Joshua Tucker, "Less than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of
Fake News Dissemination on Facebook", Science Advances 5, no. 1 (2019): 1.
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fact-boasting fake news consumed was heavily partisan influenced: “of the 20
top-performing false election stories identified in the analysis, all but three were overtly
pro-Donald Trump or anti-Hillary Clinton. Two of the biggest false hits were a story
claiming Clinton sold weapons to ISIS and a hoax claiming the pope endorsed Trump”87.
This finding lends credence to the notion that political content is not only frequented and
shared across the internet, but it gains attention beyond the site where it was originally
published, encouraging individuals to consider the attention-grabbing information in light
of their partisanship and previous political knowledge.
This effect that BuzzFeed News identified as occurring during the final months of
the 2020 election is designated as “the perception gap”. A More in Common study
headed by Daniel Yudkin, Stephen Hawkins and Tim Dixon, in partnership with YouGov,
surveyed more than 2,000 Americans. The results seemingly confirm a conventional
wisdom: “the most partisan, politically active Americans … have deeply distorted
perceptions of the other side. The two groups with the widest Perception Gaps are the
Progressive Activists and the Devoted Conservatives—the most ideological and
committed groups of Democrats and Republicans”88. This finding can be understood as,
individuals who are most likely to consider political information are those who have a
cemented notion of partisanship. Thus, these individuals are most likely to interpret the
information in a partisan-exclusionary manner. These findings are also correlated with the
amount of news consumed, as “the more news people consumed, the larger their




Perception Gap”89; thus, political media does encourage an updating of previous political
information and beliefs held. This Perception Gap is only deepened by the nature of
online media, which is “characterized by the prevalence of misinformation that travels
faster, deeper, and broader than true stories. The situation is further exacerbated by
state-sponsored influence campaigns, the attention-guided marketplace, and fragmented
partisan networks”90. Thus, with the proliferation of fake news media that infiltrates itself
onto platforms that many of us are inundating ourselves with each hour, fake news is
reaching more people than ever, furthering opportunities for people to be exposed to the
news and establish updated political learning.
It is salient to examine emotions elicited surrounding political misinformation and
if partisanship influences these emotions. Weeks finds that “anger encourages partisan,
motivated evaluation of uncorrected misinformation that results in beliefs consistent with
the supported political party, while anxiety at times promotes initial beliefs based less on
partisanship and more on the information environment”91. This relates to my research
question, as Weeks furthers his research by finding that when individuals are then
exposed to corrected political misinformation, “exposure to corrections improves belief
accuracy, regardless of emotion or partisanship. The results indicate that the unique
experience of anger and anxiety can affect the accuracy of political beliefs by
strengthening or attenuating the influence of partisanship”92. Consequently, when
92Ibid., 699.
91Brian E. Weeks, "Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How Anger and Anxiety Moderate the
Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility to Political Misinformation." Journal of Communication 65, no. 4
(2015): 699.
90Jianing Li and Min-Hsin Su, "Real Talk About Fake News: Identity Language and Disconnected
Networks of the US Public’s ‘Fake News’ Discourse on Twitter", Social Media Society 6, no. 2 (2020): 1.
89Ibid.
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individuals are exposed to a political advertisement that has information on it that appears
to be reputable, this may influence a change in an individuals’ understanding regardless
of partisanship, but partisanship may have a moderating effect.
It is also important to address the Dunning-Kruger effect, which stipulates that:
“people tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities in many social and
intellectual domains [due to] miscalibration to deficits in metacognitive skill, or the
capacity to distinguish accuracy from error”93. The authors found that when individuals
improve their knowledge and execution of skills tested by Dunning and Kruger,
individuals experienced an increase in “metacognitive competence, [which] helped them
recognize the limitations of their abilities”94. This effect is crucial to understand in
relation to political information and media, this may affect how individuals are
potentially influenced by advertisements. Anson has updated Dunning and Kruger’s
findings, in which: “individuals with moderately low political expertise rate themselves
as increasingly politically knowledgeable when partisan identities are made salient. This
below‐average group is also likely to rely on partisan source cues to evaluate the political
knowledge of peers”95. Thus, there is some evidence of partisanship and political
sophistication having an interactive effect, meaning that an individual who is motivated
by partisanship, and the belief that they are politically sophisticated, are more susceptible
to partisan cues when reasoning with their priors, thus they are perhaps more likely to
95Ian G. Anson, "Partisanship, Political Knowledge, and the Dunning‐Kruger Effect", Political Psychology
39, no. 5 (2018): 1173.
94Ibid., 1121.
93Justin Kruger and David Dunning, "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's
Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77,
no. 6 (1999): 1121.
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update these priors upon exposure to political content. Moreover, individuals may utilize
partisan cues to evaluate the information presented and attempt to fall in line with the
party line when consuming political information. This topic has also been elucidated by
Bakker, Lelkes and Malka96, who find that cue receptivity, meaning partisan cues,
is strongest among those who combine a strong partisan social identification with
high cognitive resources … These results suggest that partisan cue-taking is more
often rooted in motivation to channel cognitive resources to the pursuit of identity
expression than motivation to compensate for low cognitive resources. This
implies that political cues are less likely to improve decision-making among
low-information voters than to exacerbate the issue differences of committed and
thoughtful partisans.
This can be understood as: individuals utilize partisan cues to understand information in a
manner to develop their political identity, thus political cues can encourage dedicated
partisans to interpret political information in-line with their party and potentially motivate
an updated political belief. This notion is what the authors designate as “the expressive
utility perspective”97. Ypi argues that this can actually forward democracy and political
participation as, “shared projects [policies and principles of a political party] are essential
to mediate between the plurality of individual interpretations and conceptions of the good
and the unity of the people as a legislating whole that usually forms the basis of the
state”98.
I hypothesize that those who identify in-line with the Democratic Party will be
more likely to update their answers when viewing Democratic-biased information as
98Lea Ypi, "Political Commitment and the Value of Partisanship", The American Political Science Review
110, no. 3 (2016): 602.
97Ibid., 1061.
96Bert N. Bakker, Yphtach Lelkes, and Ariel Malka, "Understanding Partisan Cue Receptivity: Tests of
Predictions from the Bounded Rationality and Expressive Utility Perspectives", The Journal of Politics 82,
no. 3 (2020): 1062.
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opposed to Republican-biased information. Moreover, those who identify in-line with the
Republican Party will be more likely to update their answers when viewing Republican-
biased information, opposed to Democratic-biased information. I hypothesize that this is
because individuals are more convinced of the information presented when it confirms
their partisan beliefs, and thus modify their priors and update their answers.
The partisan confidence hypothesis: Participants who identify with the political
source of the advertisement will be more likely to modify their first answer than




In this research design, I employ a factorial design, which “tests the interactive effects of
several categorical treatment variables”99. I employ a 3x3 factorial design, in which there
are nine possible treatments. As will be discussed later in the paper, I have three
advertisement topics and three sources of the advertisement topics. A factorial design was
the most appropriate research design for examining my research questions and testing my
theories, as I was able to study the separate effects of source, topic, and partisanship, as
well as the interactions among source, topic, and partisanship.
I would like to first acknowledge Thaler's paper “The ‘Fake News’ Effect:
Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News” for inspiring my
research design. Thaler developed an innovative method for teasing out partisan
motivated-reasoning by asking participants a policy question, providing a news
assessment of the policy topic, and re-asking a policy question. Thaler summarizes100:
With a continuous state, there is substantial heterogeneity in how Bayesian
subjects would update their beliefs from information, so the null hypothesis is
harder to reject and the magnitude of bias is hard to compare across domains. By
using this experimental paradigm, subjects’ priors are standardized, heterogeneity
across issues and subjects is testable, and the Bayesian null is more easily
falsifiable.
I updated and refined Thaler's design to focus on the effect political advertisements can
have on a participant’s understanding of the advertisement, rather than a participant’s
conception of fake news, as Thaler examined. Of course, Thaler built upon a
100The ‘Fake News’ Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News”.
99John Gerring and Dino Christenson, Applied Social Science Methodology (Cambridge: University of
Cambridge Press, 2017), 109.
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pretest-posttest design that has been utilized and researched in political science for
decades.
Campbell, Stanley and Gage in 1963 analyzed pretest and posttest experimental
design in a comprehensive chapter in the Handbook of Research on Teaching101,
examining the design, potential biases, and confounding factors that may moderate the
statistical significance of pretest and posttest experimental findings. One of the potential
disadvantages emphasized is that time between the pretest and posttest can influence the
results in a skewed manner; the authors gave an example of analyzing student IQ scores
from differing schools over a period of months with a treatment of additional academic
support. Campbell et al. argue that there are a multitude of non-specified factors that may
influence the IQ scores, and thus the pretest and posttest design would be an insufficient
method to prove a causal relationship. However, my pretest and posttest design can
mitigate this potential hindrance to evincing a causal relationship by having a nearly
immediate posttest after the treatment — it is unlikely that there are confounding factors
that would unduly influence a portion of the experimental population in such a short
period of time.
Moreover, the authors bring up the potential flaw of pretest-posttest design of
“mortality” rate, meaning that participants are dropped from the study at an uneven rate
between the experimental and control groups. My research design alleviates this concern
101Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, “Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for
Research”, in N.L. Gage (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1963), 13-20.
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by, one, utilizing the pretest as a “control” instead of the treatment102 and, two, by not
utilizing responses that are not completed or comprehensible across all nine treatments.
Finally, Campbell et al. argue that there may be an issue of representativeness in the
participant sample and between the experimental and control groups. Again, my design
accounts for this and attempts to remedy these concerns in several ways. First, there is a
completely random assignment to treatment groups; thus, there is about an equal number
of individuals in each treatment group. Second, representativeness is a potential concern
in my research design. However, I attempt to allay representativeness concerns by
randomization, and I examine my regression results with demographic controls to assess
if there is a potential skew due to features of the research participants. Pretest and posttest
experiments have been utilized with success in recent political science research103.
Arceneaux and Johnson utilized this research design when studying media choice and
perception of media104. The authors found, “with a priori measures of viewing
preferences, we can estimate the effects of news content separately for partisan
news-seekers, mainstream news-seekers, and entertainment-seekers”105.
105Ibid., 15.
104Kevin Arceneaux and Martin Johnson, "How Does Media Choice Affect Hostile Media Perceptions?
Evidence from Participant Preference Experiments", Journal of Experimental Political Science 2, no. 1
(2015): 12-25.
103Other political science research that has utilized a pretest and posttest design includes the following
research:
Maier (2011), Tedesco (2011), De Vreese (2004), Mutz and Reeves (2005), Lee Kaid et al. (2008), Brader
(2005), King and McConnell (2003).
102See the research design in depth in the following sections. Though the Reuters advertisements can also
serve as a partisan source “control”, the true controls are individuals' pretest answers, which are then
compared to their posttest answers.
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A. Methodology
i. Platforms- MTurk and Qualtrics.
I utilized two platforms for my experiment. First, I recruited participants on Amazon’s
MTurk, this makes me the “Requester”. MTurk “is a marketplace for completion of
virtual tasks that requires human intelligence”106. MTurk “Workers”, those who sign up to
complete tasks on the platform, accept HITs. A HIT, formally known as a human
intelligence task, “represents a single, self-contained, virtual task that a Worker can work
on, submit an answer, and collect a reward for completing”107; a HIT is created by the
Requester. Amazon collects 20% of the reward to cover platform usage costs108. So, for
example, if the reward for completing the HIT is $2, Amazon will charge ¢0.40, and the
total cost of the single HIT would be $2.40. However, HITs “with 10 or more
assignments will be charged an additional 20% fee on the reward you pay Workers”109,
thus the cost of this theoretical HIT would be $2.80 if there were more than ten
assignments.
There are two kinds of Workers available to employ: those with a Worker
Qualification or a Master Qualification. A Worker qualification is the everyday Worker
that signs up to participate on MTurk and must provide their “name, email address, and
password. In addition [they are] asked to agree to the Amazon Mechanical Turk
Participation Agreement and provide your country of residence”110. Importantly, this
110“About Amazon Mechanical Turk”.
109Ibid.
108“Pricing”, Amazon.com, 2018, https://www.mturk.com/pricing.
107Ibid.
106“About Amazon Mechanical Turk”, Amazon.com, 2018, https://www.mturk.com/worker/help.
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information is verified through MTurk’s identity verification procedure111, the Requester
will never be able to view this information. A Master Worker is identified statistically via
MTurk. These Workers “consistently demonstrated a high degree of success in
performing a wide range of HITs across a large number of Requesters”112. Additionally,
MTurk charges an additional 5% of the reward to utilize these Master Workers113.
However, there is no evidence that Master Workers perform any better than their Worker
counterparts114. In fact, one study found that “the reliability of data provided by Masters
was substantially lower than data provided by a general MTurk sample for one of the two
studies”115. Consequently, I utilized Workers in my experiment.
In this study, my HIT was a survey. This survey is published on Qualtrics.
Qualtrics is a cloud-based “survey software [tool] used to design, send and analyze
surveys online”116. So, Workers accepted the HIT from MTurk and the HIT brought the
Workers to the Qualtrics platform to complete the survey. After the survey was completed
the Requester was responsible for approving the HIT, this consisted of ensuring that the
survey was fully completed. After the HIT was approved, the Workers were paid for their
time and responses. In this study, the payment was in the form of one US dollar that was
available to the Workers on their Earnings page. Workers are “able to schedule a transfer
of funds from [the] available earnings balance”; this may transfer to a synced bank
116“What is Survey Software?”, Qualtrics.com, 2020, https://www.qualtrics.com/core-xm/survey-software/.
115“Reliability of MTurk Data from Masters and Workers”, 34.
114See Steven V. Rouse, “Reliability of MTurk Data From Masters and Workers”, Journal of Individual
Differences 41, no.1 (2020): 30-36 and Eric Loepp and Jarrod T. Kelley, “Distinction Without a Difference?
An Assessment of MTurk Worker Types", Research & Politics 7, no. 1 (2020): 1-8, for research that
confirms this finding.
113“Pricing”.
112“Working on HITs”, Amazon.com, 2018, https://www.mturk.com/worker/help.
111Ibid.
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account or may be converted into an Amazon gift card117. The survey responses were
stored on the Qualtrics account. After all responses were acquired, the responses were
then downloaded from Qualtrics. The multiple-choice responses were analyzed via Stata
software. The open-ended questions were analyzed individually via Google Sheets and
Qualtrics analysis.
This study was offered to MTurk workers living in the United States. 900
participants were recruited and completed the survey. See appendix one for the
recruitment form. In this experiment, the recruitment form also serves as the consent
form. MTurk is growing as a frequently utilized platform in social sciences. In a
comparative  study, Boas et al. studied MTurk, Qualtrics and Facebook in an effort to test
recruitment and representativeness of large online samples118. The findings included that,
in the United States, MTurk “stands out in terms of the low cost and speed with which
one can recruit a sample, making it the optimal choice for pretesting or exploratory
research. MTurk’s attentive and compliant subject pool may also be an advantage in some
contexts, including subtle experimental treatments, panel studies, and designs that depend
on current events”. Moreover, Hauser and Schwarz found that “MTurkers are indeed
more attentive to instructions than are undergraduate samples”, this can suggest that
“MTurk is a viable avenue for collecting survey data, crowdsourcing tasks, and even
psychological tasks that require somewhat complicated instructions”119.
119David J. Hauser and Norbert Schwarz, "Attentive Turkers: MTurk Participants Perform Better on Online
Attention Checks than Do Subject Pool Participants", Behavior Research Methods 48, no. 1 (2015): 406.
118Taylor C. Boas, Dino P. Christenson and David M. Glick, "Recruiting Large Online Samples in the




Importantly, MTurk Workers are appropriate to use in social and political science
experiments due to the majority of Workers “closely mirror[ing] the psychological
divisions of liberals and conservatives in the mass public”, with the caveat that those who
identify as “liberal” Workers hold “more characteristically liberal values and attitudes
than liberals from representative samples”120. Workers are indeed representative of the
total U.S. population, as Berinsky et al. found, “respondents recruited in this manner  [via
MTurk]  are often more representative of the U.S. population than in-person convenience
samples—the modal sample in published experimental political science”121. Berinsky’s
conclusions were established via “comparing MTurk to convenience samples from prior
work and the American National Election 2008–2009 Panel Study”122. Though a
drawback of this representativeness of the general population must be weighed against
the finding that Workers are “less representative than subjects in Internet-based panels or
national probability samples”123. MTurk also provides greater access to a more diverse
population than social media or in-person recruitment may provide, there is a powerful
benefit in utilizing a more inclusive population that may be more reflective of the general
123"Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk”, 351.
122Connor Huff and Dustin Tingley, "“Who Are These People?’ Evaluating the Demographic
Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents”, Research & Politics 2, no. 3
(2015): 1.
121Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber and Gabriel S. Lenz, "Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk”, Political Analysis 20, no. 3 (2012): 351.
120Scott Clifford, Ryan M. Jewell, Philip D. Waggoner, "Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical Turk Valid
for Research on Political Ideology?", Research & Politics 2, no. 4 (2015): 1. This finding is also found in
Boas et al.’s study,
however Boas found a more significant divergence of the degree of “ liberalism” between Workers and the
general public.
Similar results can also be seen in: Ian G. Anson, "Taking the Time? Explaining Effortful Participation
Among Low-Cost Online Survey Participants”, Research & Politics 5, no. 3 (2018).
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public as a whole124. Moreover, MTurk is able to produce results from published
experimental work, aiding in its external validity and reliability125.
Though MTurk has been demonstrated in various studies as a survey platform that
provides valid and representative results, many studies caution against an assumption that
MTurk is not without its drawbacks. Limitations can include factors about the Worker
population: they are more liberal, participation can be affected by compensation rate and
task length126, and MTurk workers may be used to taking many surveys on MTurk and
this can potentially “affect the ways in which they both answer questions and respond to
treatment conditions”127.  Additionally, though MTurk has, in many studies of the
platform, been able to reproduce previously published results from different studies, this
is not always the case and mixed results have been observed in the literature128. Though
scholars have found varying degrees of representativeness and potential concerns due to
an experimental population that is consistently participating in surveys, I contend that
MTurk is a platform that is appropriate to run this experiment on due to many studies
pointing to the effective replications and access to a wide variety of individuals at a
competitive cost rate.
128Yun Shin Lee, Yong Won Seo and Enno Siemsen, "Running Behavioral Operations Experiments Using
Amazon's Mechanical Turk", Production and Operations Management 27, no. 5 (2018): 973-989.
127"“Who Are These People?” Evaluating the Demographic Characteristics and Political Preferences of
MTurk Survey Respondents”,7.
126Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang, and Samuel D. Gosling,"Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source
of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?", Perspectives on Psychological Science 6, no. 1 (2011): 3-5.
125For literature on reproduction of results, see: Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental
Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk”. For literature on replications and MTurk: Luca Gandullia,
Emanuela Lezzi and Paolo Parciasepe, "Replication with MTurk of the Experimental Design by
Gangadharan, Grossman, Jones & Leister (2018): Charitable Giving across Donor Types", Journal of
Economic Psychology 78 (2020): 1-8.
124Krista Casler, Lydia Bickel and Elizabeth Hackett, "Separate but Equal? A Comparison of Participants
and Data Gathered via Amazon’s MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-face Behavioral Testing", Computers
in Human Behavior 29, no. 6 (2013): 2156-2160.
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ii. The Survey- Segment One- Demographic, Partisanship, and Voting Behavior
Questions.
The survey published consists of three segments. The first segment contains three parts.
First, there are basic demographic information questions. This includes: gender, race, age,
and education. Second, there are questions that will allow me to test my theories
regarding partisanship and electoral participation. Finally, there are questions to test
political sophistication. This includes questions that ask about the number of justices on
the Supreme Court, who is the current Speaker of the House, and the number of
amendments to the Constitution. See appendix two for the complete first segment
questions.
iii. The Survey- Segment Two- Testing Partisanship Learning and Motivated Reasoning.
Before I go into detail regarding the formation and content of the advertisements,
segment two, I will explain exactly how I am testing motivated reasoning and partisan
learning. There are three political policy topics examined in this experiment: the
economy, labor and immigration. Each policy topic contains three possible
advertisements that a participant was randomly assigned to, regardless of the answers in
segment one.
Two of the advertisement sources were 2020 campaign advertisements for former
President Donald Trump and President-Elect Joe Biden. These advertisements were
designed and created by myself in Photoshop, there is absolutely no affiliation with either
campaign. To additionally clarify, neither campaign ever put out the advertisements nor
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the information presented in the advertisements that participants in this experiment will
see. The third advertisement was for the arguably neutral source of Reuters129, advertising
for viewers to subscribe to their news. To clarify again, I designed and created the
Reuters advertisements in Photoshop as well and there is no affiliation with the news
source of Reuters. At no time did Reuters ever put out the advertisements regarding the
subscriptions nor did Reuters advertise the information presented in the advertisements.
However, the participants of this survey believed that the advertisements were real and
from the source implied, thus I utilized the research tactic of deception130. This deception
was critical to my experiment, as I attempted to hone in on the theory that an
advertisement, from a source, has the ability to modify a participant’s response and
assumption about a topic. For this theory to be accurately tested, the participants must
hold the belief that it is truly Trump, Biden or Reuters that produced, and endorsed, these
advertisements; this is the only mechanism that concentrates on the effects of partisanship
on learning and reasoning. Finally, I would like to emphasize that all information
presented in the advertisements is entirely true and accurate. It is important that the
information in the political advertisements is factually correct and unbiased; for example,
there is nothing inherently partisan about the unemployment rate being at 3.7%. These
two facets of the information presented, truthful and nonpartisan, are important to the
experiments because it allows the participant to place their own partisan slant on the
information (perhaps influenced by the faces and logos of Trump or Biden),
consequently, one can then test partisan motivated reasoning.
130With approval from the IRB- Protocol 5810E. Please contact the author for proof of IRB approval or
questions regarding approval.
129“Media Bias Ratings”, Allsides.com, 2020, https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings.
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For example, a single participant could be randomly assigned to the “economic”
policy topic and randomly receive the “Donald Trump” advertisement from the policy
group advertisement possibilities. Here, I must emphasize that in each policy topic each
respondent received an identical question, regardless of which advertisement they were
assigned. This is to reduce the possibility that the language of the question impacted the
participants’ responses. I am controlling, as much as possible, for all influences that may
affect the participants’ understanding and assumptions of the policy topic and the
advertisement (the information source). I am striving to boil down the preexisting
quintessence of partisanship association and, after an intervention by advertisement that
exploits this partisanship, the independent interpretation and application of the
information presented. Thus, it is crucial that the question asked is identical for the policy
topic regardless of advertisement treatment assigned.
In sum, there were three policy topics (the economy, labor, and immigration) and
three possible advertisements that a participant could have received per policy topic; so,
in total, there were nine advertisements and thus nine treatments. I will now refer to the
group of the three possible advertisements for each policy topic (Trump, Biden or
Reuters) as the source of the advertisement. The setup was as follows for segment two.
For ease, I will continue to use the example of the “economic” topic and the “Donald
Trump” advertisement.
After answering the demographic questions, the participant was randomly
assigned to both a policy topic and a corresponding advertisement (“economic” and
“Donald Trump”). First, the participant was asked an open-ended question pertaining to
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the economy. The question asked for the response to be in the form of a number. For this
example, the question asked was “How much did the United States collect in tariffs from
China at the end of 2018, Trump’s second year of presidency? Please write your answer
in number of billions, for example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000”. After answering this
question, the participant received an advertisement, in this example, one of Donald
Trump. The advertisement contained an image of Trump with the following text “$14
billion in tariffs is holding China accountable”. On the next line, a promotion of Trump’s
presidency regarding this policy topic: “Strengthening the American Economy”. Finally,
there is Trump’s “Keep America Great!” logo. After viewing the advertisement, the
participant was asked the same question as before. This method of utilizing questions that
call for a quantitative response is essential to testing my hypotheses, as it allows me to
analyze the magnitude of a change in answer after the intervention of the advertisement.
Before moving on to the third segment of the survey, participants were asked to write a
one sentence response speaking to how the participant came about their final answer. This
open-ended response provided insight and allowed me to test qualitatively why the
participant did or did not change their answer. This provides a more nuanced
understanding of the participants and the application of the advertisement information.
See appendix three for the complete second segment questions and advertisements.
iv. The Survey- Segment Two- The Politicians’ Advertisements, in Detail.
It was incredibly important that politicians’ images presented homogenous facial
expressions across every advertisement and policy topic; this is in an attempt to not bias
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the viewer of the advertisement. This bias may be in the form of subtly assigning a
narrative to the information and statistics, or as a primer of an emotion that may prejudice
the participant to an affected conclusion. For example, one would not want in the same
policy topic an image of Donald Trump appearing “angry” with creased eyebrows, an
open mouth and a broad gesture and an image of Joe Biden appearing “confused” or
“overwhelmed”, these images certainly would bias the responses elicited.
To avoid any biases, I chose only images of both political figures with “neutral”
expressions. I defined a neutral facial expression as: closed lips, no significant upturn or
downturn of the lips and brows not furrowed. This is in line with Matsumoto’s work131
and in one study,“neutral faces were perceived as ‘strong’, specific expressions
(‘neutral’) because they are a mixture of low-intensity emotional messages”132. Thus, as
neutral expressions “do not initially convey an explicit emotional message”, allowing
“individuals … to assign them an affective content”133, they are the best form of
expression to utilize in this experiment. Neutral expressions in the advertisements
allowed the participant to associate an emotion that is not assigned by the researcher,
making the interpretation and following “guess” free from influence of a leading facial
expression. This allows the experiment to test the efficacy of the images of the politicians
and the impact of the language on the understanding and application of information
133Fernando Carvajal et al., "Is a Neutral Expression Also a Neutral Stimulus? A Study with Functional
Magnetic Resonance." Experimental Brain Research 228, no. 4 (2013): 467.
132Pilar Carrera-Levillain and Jose-Miguel Fernandez-Dols, "Neutral Faces in Context: Their Emotional
Meaning and Their Function." Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 18, no. 4 (1994): 282. Parentheses authors’
own.
131David Matsumoto, "Behavioral Predictions Based On Perceptions Of Facial Expressions Of Emotion",
Social Behavior and Personality 11, no. 1 (1983): 97-105.
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presented. Moreover, this allowed the experiment to escape the liberal and conservative
differences in understanding of varied politician facial expressions134.
To emphasize uniformity in the images of the politicians, I additionally only
selected images in which the individuals were facing forward with their eyes pointed
either directly at the photographer or slightly to the side, furthermore the eyes did not
have a discernible expression. I also only chose images of the then candidates in the
formal attire of suits. Each advertisement features the same color navy background and
the same font, in the same size, in white. There is also the respective past candidates’
logo that is faded in one of the bottom corners of the advertisement. All efforts were
made for maximum homogeneity between the advertisements.
v. The Survey- Segment Two- The Reuters Advertisements, in Detail.
The Reuters advertisements created for this thesis emphasize, again, homogeneity. Each
Reuters advertisement has four components.  First, the advertisement features the same
statistic as the politicians’ advertisements but with a completely neutral presentation, it is
stated as a fact. Next, there is the phrase “policies and impact tracked”; this is in relation
to the previous statistic and will help inform the viewer what Reuters does. Third is the
marketing invocation: “subscribe to the world’s largest international multimedia news
provider”. Finally, there is the Reuters logo at the bottom of the advertisement. Like the
politicians’ advertisements, each advertisement features the same color navy background
and the same font, in the same size, in white.
134Lasse Laustsen and Michael Bang Petersen, "Winning Faces Vary by Ideology: How Nonverbal Source
Cues Influence Election and Communication Success in Politics”, Political Communication 33, no. 2
(2016): 188-211.
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vi. The Survey- Segment Two- Questions and Information for the Advertisements.
The Labor Policy Topic
For the labor policy topic, the question that all participants who are randomly assigned to
this topic is: “what was the average unemployment rate in 2019, the third year of Trump’s
presidency?”. The correct answer is 3.7%. The American unemployment rate was
calculated via monthly data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This yearly
statistic is an average that was calculated by myself utilizing the data.
The Economic Policy Topic
For the foreign affairs policy topic, the question that all participants who are randomly
assigned to this topic is: “How much did the United States collect in tariffs from China at
the end of 2018, Trump’s second year of presidency?”. The amount of money the United
States collected via tariffs on China in 2018 was retrieved via data from the World Trade
Organization’s site “Tariff Analysis Online”. The exact number is 13,932 million (or
13.932 billion) dollars collected from China in 2018. For this research study, I rounded
the number up to 14,000 million (or 14 billion) for ease in responding to the question and
for ease in creating the advertisement; I utilized the 14 billion statistic.
The Immigration Policy Topic
For the immigraiton policy topic, the question that all participants who are randomly
assigned to this topic is: “in 2018, the second year of Trump’s presidency, what was the
number of immigrants in the United States?”. The number of immigrants in the United
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States was retrieved via data from the Migration Policy Institute. The Institute has the
exact statistic of “44,728,700” for the number of immigrants in the United States in 2018.
For this research study, I rounded the number up to 45,000,000 (45 million) for ease in
responding to the question and for ease in creating the advertisement.
vii. The Survey- Segment Three- Concluding the Survey.
To end the survey, I asked the participants to copy a randomly generated number from
Qualtrics so that their responses can be approved and they may be paid promptly. This is
also to ensure that participants did not utilize a bot to complete the survey. In the same
vein, the respondents must complete a reCAPTCHA. “reCAPTCHA uses an advanced
risk analysis engine and adaptive challenges to keep malicious software from engaging in
abusive activities on your website”135. This includes identifying images with a particular
characteristic the reCAPTCHA requires. See appendix four for the complete third
segment survey questions.
135“What is reCAPTCHA?”, Google.com, https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/.
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VIII. The Advertisements - Complete Second Segment Advertisements.
A. Policy Topic: Labor
Figure Two: Donald Trump Labor Topic Advertisement.
Figure Three: Joe Biden Labor Topic Advertisement.
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Figure Four: Reuters Labor Topic Advertisement.
B. Policy Topic: Economic.
Figure Five: Donald Trump Economic Topic Advertisement.
53
Figure Six: Joe Biden Economic Topic Advertisement.
Figure Seven: Reuters Economic Topic Advertisement.
54
C. Policy Topic: Immigration.
Figure Eight: Donald Trump Immigration Topic Advertisement.
Figure Nine: Joe Biden Immigration Topic Advertisement.
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Figure Ten: Reuters Immigration Topic Advertisement.
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IX. Who Took This Survey? — Discussing Participants, Describing Conditions
Surrounding the Survey, and How Answers Are Counted
The survey was published on MTurk on 23 December 2020 with a HIT requisition for
900 respondents. Within four hours, I had collected 903 responses136 and closed the
MTurk HIT on both Amazon and Qualtrics. Before discussing the demographics of the
respondents, it is first crucial to examine the American political climate at the time of the
publication of the survey. After a highly contentious election “which concluded after four
tense days of vote-counting in a handful of battlegrounds”, the election was officially
called 7 Novembr 2020 with former Vice President Joe Biden and former Senator
Kamala Harris assuming the titles of President- and Vice President- Elect137. This torrid
election epoch was not yet over. Almost immediately after Biden was named President-
elect, several conservative Senators and Congressmen called for a recount and objected to
the Electoral College’s certification for Biden138. Meanwhile, President Trump and his
teams were waging legal war attempting to fight the election results in courts, even the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the President’s accusations139.
Yet, resentment and disquiet would erupt when domestic terrorists stormed the
U.S. Capitol Building on 6 January. Chaos broke out as Speaker Pelosi’s office and
podium were commandeered, Vice President Pence was evacuated, and five people died,
139Lawrence Hurley, “U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Republican Challenge to Biden's Pennsylvania Win”,
Reuters, 8 December 2020.
138David Mack, “Josh Hawley Said He'll Object To Biden's Electoral College Certification, Forcing A
Vote”, Buzzfeed News, 31 December 2020.
137Jonathan Martin and Alexander Burns, “Biden Wins Presidency, Ending Four Tumultuous Years Under
Trump”, The New York Times, 18 November 2020.
136903 responses were collected on Qualtrics before the MTurk HIT closed. A total of 82 respondents
started the survey, but did not complete the survey. These individuals were not paid and their responses
were not utilized in this study. All individuals who submitted a ten-digit code to Amazon (900) were both
paid and debriefed, with their responses utilized in this study.
57
in addition to countless injuries140. These terrorists raided the Capitol due to concerns
about liberal politicians and the Electoral College “stealing” the election from President
Trump141. President Trump contended at the Save America Rally: “we won this election,
and we won it by a landslide. This was not a close election”; Trump concluded: “And we
fight. We fight like Hell and if you don’t fight like Hell, you’re not going to have a
country anymore”142. My survey, again, was published on 23 December, which lies
between the bellicose election, the rise of a subset of conservative politicians and
individuals online calling the results of the election into question and, most recently143,
the taking of the Capitol. Consequently, my survey likely picked up on the increased
emotions and influence regarding American politics. This could be interpreted as
individuals holding more political knowledge and being more aware of the political
issues and statistics that are asked about in the survey. Thus, the results may be skewed
compared to a theoretical survey published in 2018 before the uptake in election drama
and attention, and may be even more skewed in light of the crises surrounding the
election, the Electoral College, and the inauguration. This may lead to a Type I error, in
which individuals are more incentivized to reason in a partisan-motivated manner and
thus I am more likely to reject the null hypothesis. This may also be seen in the
143At the time of writing, 15 January 2021.
142Donald Trump, “Save America”, Speech, The Ellipse, Washington, D.C., 6 January 2021,
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6.
141George Petras et al., “Timeline: How A Trump Mob Stormed The Us Capitol, Forcing Washington Into
Lockdown”, USA Today, 15 January 2021.
140For information on the people who died during the storm of the capital see: Eric Levenson, Amir Vera,
and Mallika Kallingal, “What We Know About The 5 Deaths In The Pro-Trump Mob That Stormed The
Capitol”, CNN, 8 January 2021. For information on Speaker Pelosi’s belongings and office during the riot
see: Brandon Conradis, “Pelosi's Office Vandalized After Pro-Trump Rioters Storm Capitol”, The Hill, 6
January 2021. For information on Vice President Pence on the day of the riot see: Ashley Parker, Carol D.
Leonnig, Paul Kane, and Emma Brown, “How The Rioters Who Stormed The Capitol Came Dangerously
Close To Pence”, The Washington Post, 15 January 2021.
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open-ended questions in the survey, there were certainly polarizing answers; highlights
included one individual consistently referring to “democrats” as “demon-crats”, and some
choice words about Speaker Pelosi, which shall not be written here.
So, who are the 900 respondents who took this survey? First, I should note that I
eliminated 119 respondents from my survey due to either unintelligible responses in the
treatment sections or an answer that did not follow what the question asked144, thus I have
784 unique respondents in my survey. Out of the 784 respondents about 61% are male,
39% are female and 0.40% identify as non-binary (see Table One). This gender
distribution is slightly different from the United States national population, as about 49%
of citizens in the United States identify as male145, this was also a slightly higher
percentage than other MTurk studies conducted146.
146For a distribution of gender of MTurk participants in previous studies, please refer to: Dino P.
Christenson and David M. Glick, “Crowdsourcing Panel Studies and Real- Time Experiments in MTurk”,
The Political Methodologist, 20(2): 27-33.
145The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Population Male, 2019, retrieved from:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.MA.ZS?locations=US.
144For an example of an “unintelligible response”, one individual responded to the question: “In 2018, the
second year of Trump’s presidency, what was the number of immigrants in the United States? Please write
your answer in number of millions, for example 10 million, not 10,000,000” with the answer of “$46
BILLION” (answer is printed exactly as appeared in the survey). Clearly, a monetary response was not
appropriate for this answer and the respondent was removed from the study due to the response to the
treatment being unusable. For an example of answer “that did not follow what the question asked”, one
individual responded to the same question about immigrants as above in this footnote with the response
“754,thousand” (again, answer is printed exactly as appeared in the survey). This response was not
consistent with the question asked, which asked for the answer to be at least a million.
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Table One: Gender of Respondents
The age of respondents was somewhat surprising. The age group of 18-24 was the second
smallest group (making up 3.58% of the total survey population) only beat by the age
group of 75-84 (making up 0.38% of the total survey population). In a longitudinal study
conducted by the Pew Research Center from 2000 to 2019, the study found that by 2019
nearly 100% of the individuals in the  age group of 18-29 utilized the internet
consistently147.  Thus, I expected this age group to have more respondents than 28. Table
Two provides a breakdown of the age of respondents in this study. This is slightly
different than the national average, as 36% of U.S. citizens are of the ages from 18-44
(compared to this study’s 68%)148.
148Jonathan Vespa, Lauren Medina, and David M. Armstrong, “Demographic Turning Points for the United
States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060”, U.S. Census Bureau, February 2020.
147“Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet”, Pew Research Center, 12 June 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/.
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Table Two: Age of Respondents
Race and education were also demographic questions inquired about in the pre-treatment
questionnaire. Respondents to this survey overwhelmingly identified as “white” with
about 80% of the population choosing this identification; this is similar to other MTurk
studies conducted149 and the national average is about 72%150, see Table Three for more
information. Moreover, a substantial number of respondents reported to hold a four-year
degree (about 55%); about 28% of individuals hold a combination of either some college
education or a professional degree — see Table Four for more information on the
education level of respondents in this study. These demographic statistics are extremely
similar to previous MTurk studies (about 50% of the survey population holding a
150“2019 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates”, U.S. Census Bureau, 2019,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?q=United%20States&g=0100000US.
149See Christenson and Glick.
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four-year college degree)151 but very different from the U.S. population, as about 33% of
individuals hold a four-year college degree152.
Table Three: Race of Respondents
Table Four: Education of Respondents
152Reid Wilson, “Census: More Americans Have College Degrees Than Ever Before”, The Hill, 3 April
2017.
151See Christenson and Glick.
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I also surveyed individuals regarding their partisanship and past voting history. A
large majority of participants purported to have voted in 2016 (about 88%). 48% of
individuals who voted in 2016 cast their vote for Clinton and Kaine and 44% of
individuals voted for Trump and Pence. This is in-line with the national election results,
with Clinton and Kaine garnering 48.2% of the popular vote, and Trump and Pence
amassing 46.1% of the popular vote153. Table Five explores which candidates were voted
for among the individuals who voted in 2016.
Table Five: 2016 Candidates Voted For Among Those Who Voted.
I surveyed individuals about who they voted for in 2020; Biden and Harris won the
majority of the vote from this survey of MTurk workers (about 65%) and Trump and
Pence won a minority of votes with about 24% of respondents voting for the pair.
Interestingly, only about 9% of the surveyed population did not vote in the 2020
presidential election. Examining the national average, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris
received 51.3% of the popular votes cast in 2020154, thus one may conclude that this
154Drew Desilver, “Biden’s Victory Another Example Of How Electoral College Wins Are Bigger Than
Popular Vote Ones”, Pew Research Center, 11 December 2020.
153Gregory Krieg, “It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump In Popular Vote”, CNN, 22 December 2016.
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survey population voted for the Democratic party by a greater extent than the general
American population. Below, Table Six conveys greater information regarding which
candidates individuals voted for in 2020 in this survey.
Table Six: 2020 Candidates Voted For Among Those Who Voted.
Finally, I address self-reported partisanship and party identification. This is
interesting due to a polarizing election that had the potential to cross the aisle; for
example, those who identify as conservative may have voted for Biden and Harris due to
the nature of Trump’s tenure in office. In this survey: about 51% of individuals identified
as a Democrat, 27% of individuals identified as a Republican and a total sum of about
23% of individuals identified as either Independent or Other — Table Seven presents this
information. Survey participants identified as Democratic similarly compared to the
national average, according to a post-election Gallup poll, about 50% of U.S. adults
identify as Democrats while 39% identify as Republicans; therefore, though the
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Democratic identification is close to the national average, less survey participants
identified as Republican compared to the U.S. at large155.
Table Seven: Partisan Self-Identification of Respondents
The breakdown of identification on a political scale is also telling. About 31% of
respondents identified as liberal with an additional 12% identifying as extremely liberal;
this is in stark contrast to a conservative identification with a total of about 30% of
respondents identifying as any variation of conservative. More surprisingly, only about
17% of individuals identified as moderate or centrist, calling into question if there is a
disappearing center and instead a growing number of the population identifies with some
variation of a party and, moreover, if there is growing polarization with more people
identifying as extremely conservative or liberal (a total of 18% of the surveyed
population identified with a variant of “extreme”). Survey participants leaned more
155A breakdown of political party affiliations according to Gallup: “Currently, half of U.S. adults identify as
Democrats (32%) or are independents who lean toward the Democratic Party (18%). Meanwhile, 39%
identify as Republicans (26%) or are Republican leaners (13%)”. Source for this quote in the footnote and
the statistics referenced in the text is as follows: Jeffrey M. Jones, “U.S. Party Preferences Have Swung
Sharply Toward Democrats”, Gallup, 16 July 2020.
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heavily liberal than the national average (54% in this survey compared to 24%), less
conservative than the national average (29% in this survey compared to 37%), and less
moderate than the national average (17% in this survey compared to 35%)156.
Table Eight: Political Scale Self-Identification of Respondents
Next, I will describe how I coded the sophistication questions. For the first sophistication
question, “which party currently has the most members in the Senate in Washington?”, I
counted any spelling of “Republican” as legitimate, as long as it was clear that the
respondent intended to answer “Republican”157, any other answer was counted as
illegitimate; 479 respondents answered “Republican” in response to this sophistication
question.
157Examples of “Republican” spellings that were counted as legitimate included: “republicains”, “Republic
Party” and “Republic”. Answers counted as “Democrat”, but still counted as illegitimate, included:
“democarate”, “Democratic Party” and “DEMOCRAT”. Answers that were clearly a joke, such as “Texas”
and respondents who purported to not know and did not guess were counted as “Other”, and illegitimate, as
well. All answers are reported exactly as respondents answered in the Qualtrics survey.
156Lydia Saad, “The U.S. Remained Center-Right, Ideologically, in 2019”, Gallup, 9 January 2020.
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For the second sophistication question, “who is the current speaker of the
House?”, I counted any misspelling (or correct spelling) of “Nancy Pelosi” as legitimate,
as long as it was intelligible that the respondent was attempting to answer “Nancy
Pelosi”; any other answer was counted as illegitimate158. 717 respondents answered
“Nancy Pelosi” in response to this sophistication question.
For the third sophistication question, “how many justices sit on the Supreme
Court?”, I counted: “nine”, “9”, “nine justices”and “one Chief Justice and eight Associate
Justices” as legitimate answers, any other answer I counted as illegitimate159; 639
participants answered “9” in response to this sophistication question.
For the fourth, and final, sophistication question, “how many amendments are
there to the Constitution?”, I counted: “27 amendments”, “27” and variations of “twenty
seven” spelled out as legitimate answers, any other answer I counted as illegitimate160;
463 respondents answered “27” in response to this sophistication question.
Now, I will address the first treatment topic in this study, the unemployment
rate161; I counted any number between 0 and 100 legitimate. For the second treatment,
161The unemployment rate question for Trump, Biden and Reuters is: “what was the average unemployment
rate in 2019, the third year of Trump’s presidency?”.
160Answers counted as “Other” included: “like 100 idk”, “not sure, a lot.” and “18”. Respondents who
purported to not know and did not guess were counted as “Other” as well. All “Other” answers were
counted as illegitimate. All answers are reported exactly as respondents answered in the Qualtrics survey.
159Answers counted as “Other” included: “John Adams”, “EIGHT” and “John Roberts”. Respondents who
purported to not know and did not guess were counted as “Other” as well. All “Other” answers were
counted as illegitimate. All answers are reported exactly as respondents answered in the Qualtrics survey.
158Examples of “Nancy Pelsoi” spellings that were counted as legitimate included: “nancy polosi”, “Nancy
Peloski” and “nancy pellosi”. Answers counted as “Other” included: “Mitch McConnel”, “Joe biden” and
“paul ryan”. Answers that were clearly a joke, such as “mike tyson” and respondents who purported to not
know and did not guess were counted as “Other” as well. All “Other” answers were counted as illegitimate.
All answers are reported exactly as respondents answered in the Qualtrics survey.
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tariffs162, I counted any number in the billions, or in the format as I requested in the
question, as legitimate; this included the formats of: “7 Billion”, “12” (connoting 12
billion), and “46,000,000,000”163. For the third treatment, the immigration question164, I
counted any number in the millions, or in the format that I requested in the question, as
legitimate; this included the formats of: “45 million”, “50” (connoting 50 million), and
“15,000,000”. For all three treatments (the three questions: unemployment, tariffs and
immigration) and three variations of each treatment (Trump, Biden, and Reuters), any
other answer save for the answers that are denoted as legitimate above, the answer was
counted as not applicable and the respondent was eliminated as part of the 108
respondents removed from the study.
164The immigration rate question for Trump, Biden and Reuters is: “in 2018, the second year of Trump’s
presidency, what was the number of immigrants in the United States? Please write your answer in number
of millions, for example 10 million, not 10,000,000”.
163Again, these answers are directly copied, in the same format, from the respondents’ answers from the
Qualtrics survey.
162The tariffs question for Trump, Biden and Reuter is: “how much did the United States collect in tariffs
from China at the end of 2018, Trump’s second year of presidency?  Please write your answer in number of
billions, for example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000””.
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X. The Big Picture
One of the overarching questions this thesis is attempting to answer is: are political
advertisements effective in inducing a changed answer in response to the same question
asked twice? Looking to the data, over 85% of individuals changed their first responses
after exposure to the political advertisements. Moreover, across treatments, more than
31% of individuals updated their first answers and submitted their second answers as the
same statistic presented in the advertisement. Consequently, I can conclusively answer




A. Testing Hypotheses — Republican Partisan Identification
To test the hypotheses put forth in this paper, I first examine those participants who
claimed a Republican identification, meaning those that stated that they identify with the
Republican party. I will run the following four regressions to examine the hypotheses. It
is important to note that for all regressions examined in this thesis, I utilize White’s
robust standard errors165. As Cunningham states in Causal Inference: The Mixtape:
“heterogeneity is just something I’ve come to accept as the rule, not the exception, so if
anything, we should be opting in to believing in homoskedasticity, not opting out. You
can just take it as a given that errors are never homoskedastic and move forward to the
solution”166. Robust standard errors are germane for this thesis, as it would be unfounded
to assume that variance of the error terms is constant across all nine treatment groups.
Regression One
















166Scott Cunningham, Causal Inference: The Mixtape (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), 76.
165Halbert White, "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for
Heteroskedasticity", Econometrica 48, no. 4 (1980): 817-838.
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first answer of the participant subtracted from the second answer, this is then divided by
. This is in order to work with the dependent variable in the form of a percentageγ
𝑖,1
change in magnitude, it also allows for interpretability of coefficients across treatments.
“Received Trump ad” is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a participant received
a Trump advertisement of any policy topic. “Received Biden ad” is a dummy variable
that is coded 1 if a participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic.
“Received economic ad” is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a participant received the
economic policy topic advertisement from any source. “Received immigration ad” is a
dummy variable that is coded 1 if a participant received the immigration policy topic
advertisement from any source.
“Trump*Immigration” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two
dummy variables, receiving a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
received) and receiving an immigration policy topic advertisement from any source
(coded 1 if received). Consequently, for “Trump*Immigration” to be coded 1, a
participant must have received the immigration policy topic from the Trump source.
“Trump*Economic” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, receiving a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received) and
receiving an economic policy topic advertisement from any source (coded 1 if received).
Consequently, for “Trump*Economic” to be coded 1, a participant must have received the
economic policy topic from the Trump source.
“Biden*Immigration” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, receiving a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received) and
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receiving an immigration policy topic advertisement from any source (coded 1 if
received). Consequently, for “Biden*Immigration” to be coded 1, a participant must have
received the immigration policy topic from the Biden source.
“Biden*Economic” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, receiving a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received) and
receiving an economic policy topic advertisement from any source (coded 1 if received).
Consequently, for “Biden*Economic” to be coded 1, a participant must have received the
economic policy topic from the Biden source.
Regression Two
In regression two, the dependent variable remains coded the same along with:
“received Trump ad”, “received Biden ad”, “received economic ad”, and “received
immigration ad”.
“Self-ID Republican” is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a participant
identified the Republican party as in line with their political beliefs; thus they identified
as Republican.
“ID Rep.*Trump ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if “yes”) and if
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the participant received a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received);
for “ID Rep.*Trump ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified with the
Republican party and received a Trump advertisement.
“ID Rep.*Biden ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if “yes”) and if
the participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received);
for “ID Rep.*Biden ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified with the
Republican party and received a Biden advertisement.
Regression Three
In regression three, the dependent variable remains coded the same along with:
“received Trump ad”, “received Biden ad”, “received economic ad”, “received
immigration ad”, and “Self-ID Republican”.
“ID Rep.*economic ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two
dummy variables, if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if “yes”)
and if the participant received an economic advertisement from any source (coded 1 if
received); for “ID Rep.*economic ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified
with the Republican party and received an economic advertisement.
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“ID Rep.*immigration ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two
dummy variables, if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if “yes”)
and if the participant received an immigration advertisement from any source (coded 1 if
received); for “ID Rep.*immigration ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified
with the Republican party and received an immigration advertisement.
Regression Four
In regression four, the dependent variable remains coded the same along with:
“received Trump ad”, “received Biden ad”, “received economic ad”, “received
immigration ad”, “Self-ID Republican”, “ID Rep.* Trump ad”, “ID Rep.*Biden ad”, “ID
Rep.*economic ad”, and “ID Rep.*immigration ad”.
“ID Rep.* Biden immigration ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised of
three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an immigration advertisement from any source
(coded 1 if “yes”). So, for “ID Rep.* Biden immigration ad” to be coded 1, a participant
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must have identified with the Republican party and received the immigration policy topic
advertisement from the Biden source.
“ID Rep.* Trump immigration ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised
of three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an immigration advertisement from any source
(coded 1 if “yes”). So, for “ID Rep.*Trump immigration ad” to be coded 1, a participant
must have identified with the Republican party and received the economic policy topic
advertisement from the Trump source.
“ID Rep.*Biden economic ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised of
three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an economic advertisement from any source (coded 1
if “yes”). So, for “ID Rep.*Biden economic ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have
identified with the Republican party and received the economic policy topic
advertisement from the Biden source.
“ID Rep.*Trump economic ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised of
three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an economic advertisement from any source (coded 1
if “yes”). So, for “ID Rep.*Trump economic ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have
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identified with the Republican party and received the economic policy topic
advertisement from the Trump source.
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Table Nine: Testing Republican Partisan Identification and Magnitude of Answer
Change.
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First, the coefficient on “economic topic” in regression one is 0.734, which
indicates that a participant who receives a Reuters advertisement on the economic topic
changes their answer by 74% more than a participant who received a Reuters
advertisement on the labor topic. Second, a participant who receives a Reuters
advertisement on the immigration topic changes their answer by 468% more than a
participant who received a Reuters advertisement on the immigration topic.
Consequently, the immigration topic is the most effective topic in advertisements
that induce the largest change in participants’ answers. The least effective policy topic is
the labor topic, which induces the smallest change in participants' answers. What this
regression suggests is: that an advertisement with Biden or Trump’s face on it is, by itself,
does not induce a statistically significant change in a participant’s answer. This is novel,
as the conventional wisdom is that an advertisement with a candidate’s face on it is
generally assumed to have more of an impact in persuading a change in an individual’s
priors than an advertisement without the candidate’s face. Looking at the signs of the
coefficients, individuals update their answers consistently less when viewing a Trump
advertisement compared to a Reuters advertisement. Individuals update their answers less
when viewing a Biden advertisement on immigration and more when viewing a Biden
advertisement on the economic topic, both compared to the Reuters advertisements.
Next I will examine the output of regression two. Here, several variables of
interest are statistically significant. The self-identification of relating to the Republican
party is statistically significant, an individual who identifies with the Republican party
modifies his answer by 226% more than individuals who identify with the Democratic
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party or no party at all. Moreover, when individuals who identify with the Republican
party view a Biden advertisement, these participants update their answer by 254% less
than when viewing a Reuters advertisement. Those who identify with the Republican
party are no more likely to update their answers when viewing a Trump advertisement,
which is interesting because one would think these individuals would increase their
answers more in magnitude when viewing an advertisement that aligns with their
partisanship. Overall, I would argue that there is some evidence of motivated reasoning
conveyed by this regression output, as individuals who view advertisements that do not
conform with their partisanship change their answer by less, and statistically significantly
less so.
Examining regression three, one variable of interest is significant. Those who
identify with the Republican party and receive an immigration advertisement modify
their answers by about 300% more than participants who do not identify with the
Republican party and received the labor advertisements. However, individuals who
identify themselves with the Republican party do not change their answers by a
statistically significant amount when viewing the economic advertisements. This may be
interpreted as there not being a strong relationship between partisanship and topic of the
advertisement.
Finally, examining regression four, there is a familiar finding. Those who identify
as Republican and receive an immigration topic advertisement update their answers by
700% more (!) than those who do not identify as Republican and received the labor topic
advertisement. But, individuals who identify as Republican and received the Biden
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immigration advertisement update their answer by about 800% less (!). Interestingly,
though not statistically significant, those who identify as Republican update their answers
less when viewing any advertisement from a Trump or Biden source; these partisans
change their answers by more when viewing the Reuters advertisements. I would argue
that this regression does suggest that participants in this survey utilized motivated
reasoning when considering updating their answers; this is seen specifically when
participants are exposed to non-partisan confirming political advertisements. Moreover,
when considering all regression outputs showcased in table nine, I would put forth
several findings. One, a candidate’s face and the topic of the advertisement are largely not
enough to motivate a statistically significant change in a participant’s answer if
partisanship is not taken into account. Two, when partisanship is considered, the
advertisements that do induce a statistically significant change in partisanship are the
advertisements that are from the Biden source and, specifically, address immigration. One
way this may be interpreted is that those who identify as Republican do not trust or
believe Biden especially when Biden is opining about the state of immigration in the
United States. A new finding is also that those who identify with the Republican party are
very convinced by the Reuters advertisements and update their answers more than when
viewing a Trump advertisement. Overall, I would argue that these regressions do provide
evidence of partisan motivated reasoning.
The triple interaction findings are also presented on a coefficient plot. The plot
shows the coefficients of the interaction terms and their 95% confidence intervals. Thus,
when looking at the triple interactions from table nine, one can ascertain a significant
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difference on two fronts. One, there is significant deviation from zero for the immigration
topic; a plot point near zero would indicate that individuals did not update their answers
significantly after being exposed to the source. This confirms my finding that the
immigration topic advertisements are incredibly efficacious, even more so compared to
both the labor and the economic topics. Second, through the plotted triple interaction
coefficients, it is clear that the Biden immigration advertisement commanded a greater
change in participants’ answers compared to the Trump immigration advertisement. This
is consistent across regressions, and I argue provides concrete support for the
partisan-motivated reasoning theory.
Graph One: Table Nine Triple Interactions Plotted
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B. Testing Hypotheses — Democratic Partisan Identification
Next, I will examine the same regressions but examine those who identify with the
Democratic party. The following regressions will be run.
Regression One (Again)
All variables are defined in the same manner as regression one presented earlier.
This regression is utilized in this table as a baseline to compare the Democratic and
Republican partisanships, thus the output is a duplicate of the regression one output in
Table One.
Regression Five
Here, in regression five, the dependent variable remains coded the same along
with: “received Trump ad”, “received Biden ad”, “received economic ad”, and “received
immigration ad”. “Self-ID Democrat” is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a participant
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identified the Democratic party as in line with their political beliefs; thus they identified
as a Democrat.
“ID Dem.*Trump ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if “yes”) and if
the participant received a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received);
for “ID Dem.*Trump ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified with the
Democratic party and received a Trump advertisement.
“ID Dem.*Biden ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two dummy
variables, if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if “yes”) and if
the participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if received);
for “ID Dem.*Biden ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified with the
Democratic party and received a Biden advertisement.
Regression Six
In regression six, the dependent variable remains coded the same along with:
“received Trump ad”, “received Biden ad”, “received economic ad”, “received
immigration ad”, and “Self-ID Republican”.
“ID Dem.*economic ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two
dummy variables, if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if “yes”)
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and if the participant received an economic advertisement from any source (coded 1 if
received); for “ID Dem.*economic ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have identified
with the Democratic party and received an economic advertisement.
“ID Dem*immigration ad” is a dummy interaction variable that consists of two
dummy variables, if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if “yes”)
and if the participant received an immigration advertisement from any source (coded 1 if
received); for “ID Dem.*immigration ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have
identified with the Democratic party and received an immigration advertisement.
Regression Seven
In regression seven, the dependent variable remains coded the same along with:
“received Trump ad”, “received Biden ad”, “received economic ad”, “received
immigration ad”, “Self-ID Democrat”, “ID Dem.* Trump ad”, “ID Dem.*Biden ad”, “ID
Dem.*economic ad”, and “ID Dem.*immigration ad”.
“ID Dem.* Biden immigration ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised
of three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Republican party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
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“yes”), and if a participant received an immigration advertisement from any source
(coded 1 if “yes”). So, for “ID Dem.* Biden immigration ad” to be coded 1, a participant
must have identified with the Republican party and received the immigration policy topic
advertisement from the Biden source.
“ID Dem.* Trump immigration ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised
of three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an immigration advertisement from any source
(coded 1 if “yes”). So, for “ID Dem.*Trump immigration ad” to be coded 1, a participant
must have identified with the Democratic party and received the economic policy topic
advertisement from the Trump source.
“ID Dem.*Biden economic ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised of
three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Biden advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an economic advertisement from any source (coded 1
if “yes”). So, for “ID Dem.*Biden economic ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have
identified with the Democratic party and received the economic policy topic
advertisement from the Biden source.
“ID Dem.*Trump economic ad” is a dummy triple interaction term comprised of
three dummy variables: if a participant identified with the Democratic party (coded 1 if
“yes”), if a participant received a Trump advertisement of any policy topic (coded 1 if
“yes”), and if a participant received an economic advertisement from any source (coded 1
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if “yes”). So, for “ID Dem. *Trump economic ad” to be coded 1, a participant must have
identified with the Democratic party and received the economic policy topic
advertisement from the Trump source.
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Table Ten: Testing Democratic Partisan Identification and Magnitude of Answer
Change.
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Examining regression five, several variables of interest were statistically
significant. The self-identification of relating to the Democratic party is statistically
significant, an individual who identifies with the Democratic party modifies his answer
by 207% less than individuals who identify with the Republican party or no party at all;
this is in contrast to the self-identifying Republicans, who update their answer by about
220% more. Moreover, when individuals who identify with the Democratic party view a
Biden advertisement, these participants update their answer by 220% more than when
viewing a Reuters advertisement. A pattern is beginning to discern itself, as those who
identify with the Republican party update their answer less and those who identify with
the Democratic party update their answer more. Interestingly, individuals of both
partisanships do not update their answers by a statistically significant amount when
viewing a Trump advertisement, this to me can be understood as, individuals in this
survey do not trust Trump and utilizing a Trump advertisement will not motivate
individuals to update their answers.
Examining regression six, one variable of interest is significant. Those who
identify with the Demcoratic party and receive an immigration advertisement modify
their answers by about 220% less than participants who did not identify with the
Democratic party and received the unemployment rate advertisements. This is in contrast
to those who identify with the Republican party, as they increased their answers by 300%
more; this also follows the observed pattern. Individuals who identify with the
Democratic party did not significantly update their answers after viewing the economic
advertisement, this is consistent with those identifying with the Republican party. Once
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more I make the case that perhaps the relationship between partisanship and topic of
advertisement is not as strong or as meaningful; this is bolstered by the consistent and
large significance of the immigration advertisement across each regression run.
Analyzing regression seven, there are many significant findings. First, an
individual who identifies with the Democratic party modifies his answer by about 100%
less than individuals who identify with the Republican party or no party at all, and this is
statistically significant. Viewing the interaction of partisanship and advertisements, those
who identify with the Democratic party and receive a Biden advertisement update their
answer by about 170% more than an individual who identifies with the Democratic party
and did not receive a Biden advertisement. Though not statistically significant, these
individuals hardly updated their answers when receiving a Trump advertisement
(modified their answer by 2% less). This is a consistent finding with regression five.
Examining the topics of the advertisements and the interaction with partisanship, the
immigration topic interaction is once again significant with a similar coefficient;
individuals update their answer by about 290% less. Examining the triple interaction
variables, the only significant variable is the Democrat-identifying individuals who
update their answers by about 100% more when exposed to an economic advertisement
from Biden; this finding reinforces my belief that the topic is not nearly as important
when considering how much an individual updates their answer as the source of the
advertisement.
When looking at the triple interactions from table ten, one can ascertain a
significant difference on two fronts. Again, there is significant deviation from zero for the
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immigration topic and in this plot, the economic topic from the Biden source; a plot point
near zero would indicate that individuals did not update their answers significantly after
being exposed to the source. Once more, the immigration topic advertisements are
incredibly efficacious, compared to both the labor and the economic topics. Through the
plotted triple interaction coefficients, it is clear that the Biden economic advertisement
and the Trump immigration advertisement commended a greater change in participants’
answers compared to the Trump economic advertisement, though the Trump immigration
advertisement is not significant in the triple interaction with the Republican
identification. I would argue that the triple interactions provide support for the
partisan-motivated reasoning theory.
Graph Two: Table Ten Triple Interactions Plotted
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Overall, I believe that the results from table ten support my theory of partisan-
motivated reasoning. First, individuals who identify with the Democratic party update
their answers significantly when exposed to partisan-conforming advertisements. Second,
Trump advertisements never motivated a significant change in answer for these
participants. Third, partisanship presents itself as the most important characteristic when
considering how much an individual will update their answers; again, a candidate’s face
and the topic of the advertisement are largely not enough to motivate a change in a
participant’s answer. Finally, political advertisements are efficacious and take advantage
of partisan-motivated reasoning.
C. Direction of Updating
One may argue that just examining the magnitude of the change of a participant’s answer
does not relay a complete understanding of how individuals, especially expressed
partisans, are motivated to update their answers after exposure to political
advertisements. Therefore, I examined regressions one through seven with the dependent
variable of the amount of change in a participant’s answer without taking into account the
magnitude, this allows me to examine the direction of the change, either increasing or
decreasing their answer, insteading of examining if individuals change their answer by
less or more.
First, I will examine the Republican partisan identification. Analyzing regressions
one through four with the alternative dependent variable, the regression results are
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strikingly similar to table nine167. I will now consider the results in contrast to the table
nine outputs. One, receiving the immigration advertisement is consistently significant,
and positive, across each regression with a similar coefficient to the table nine results.
The relationship to the source of the advertisement, specifically the Trump source, is
slightly inconsistent with the table nine outputs. When examining just the source of the
advertisement (the variable “received Trump ad”), this variable is significant at the
ten-percent level twice, with individuals updating their response by about 100% more in a
positive direction. However, when the source of the Trump advertisement is interacted
with partisanship, a Trump source advertisement is never significant in motivating a
change in a participant’s answer in both table nine and in the updated regression outputs
in table eleven.
The variable of self-identifying with the Republican party is significant just once
in both regression outputs, both in the second regression; this variable has a similar
coefficient and is positive. When partisanship and the source is interacted, similar
answers are found. When examining partisanship and the Biden source for the
advertisement, respondents update their answers negatively by about 260%.  When
examining the triple interaction between the Republican partisanship, the Biden source
and the immigration topic, individuals update their answers downward by nearly 800%.
Both of these findings are consistent with the table ten findings. When just examining the
topic of the advertisement, specifically immigration, is always significant with a large
positive coefficient across regressions and both tables.
167To see regression specifications and the outputs, please see table eleven in appendix five.
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Interestingly, when Republican partisans are exposed to Trump advertisements
(and the variables are interacted), there is no statistically significant effect on how much,
or what direction, a respondent updates his answer. In sum, I contend that motivated
reasoning is consistent even when examining this theory with a different dependent
variable. Moreover, this proves that Republicans update their answers negatively when
viewing a Biden-source advertisement, especially when the advertisement addresses
immigration. Thus, though Trump does not have a significant impact on how much, or in
which direction, a Republican partisan’s answer is updated, Republicans are very
motivated to update their answer negatively and by a significant amount in response to a
Biden advertisement on immigration.
Next, I will examine the Democratic partisan identification. Analyzing regression
one again and regressions five through seven with the alternative dependent variable, the
regression results are in-line with the results from table ten168. I will now consider the
results in contrast to the table ten outputs. One, receiving the immigration advertisement
is consistently significant, and positive, across each regression with a similar coefficient
to the table ten results; this outcome has been observed across all regression
specifications. Similarly, the economic advertisement is rarely significant across any
regression specification. Examining the significance of just receiving a Biden
advertisement (the variable “received a Biden ad”), it is significant in regressions five and
seven, which is the same as in table ten; this variable is consistent across tables with
similar coefficients and a negative update, meaning a smaller second answer.
168To see regression specifications and the outputs, please see table twelve in appendix 5.
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I will now assess the effects of the interaction of Democratic identification.
Firstly, the variable identifying Demoratic partisanship is significant in regressions five
and seven in table twelve, with a similar coefficient as what is observed in table ten and
both are negative, meaning that, in table twelve, those who identify as a Democrat
decrease their answer by about 200% and 100% in regressions five and seven
respectively. When the identification of Democratic is interacted with receiving a Biden
advertisement, a participant increases their answer by about 220% and about 160% after
exposure in regressions five and seven; this is in-line with the findings in table ten as
individuals who identify with the Democratic party update their answers by about 220%
and 170% (as seen in regressions five and seven in table ten) more after receiving a Biden
advertisement. However, the topic of the advertisement is still important when
considering how much an individual will update their answers; Democrats decrease their
answers by about 215% and 275% (as seen in regressions six and seven in table twelve)
when exposed to an advertisement regarding immigration. When considering the
magnitude in table ten, Democrats exposed to an immigration advertisement also
modified their answers by a smaller amount. Finally, examining the triple interaction term
of a Democrat who receives an advertisement on the economic topic from Biden, a
participant who meets all these conditions increases their answer by about 120%.
Likewise when considering the magnitude in table ten, an individual who meets the triple
interaction requirements updates their answer by 100% more.
In sum, when Democrats are exposed to Biden advertisements, there is a
statistically significant effect on how much, and the direction, a respondent updates his
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answer; a self-identified Democrat updates his answer in a positive direction (meaning he
increases his answer) and by a large extent, always at least 100%. I put forth that the
hypothesis of partisan- motivated reasoning is present in these regression results —
Democrats respond to partisan confirming political advertisements.
D. Distinct Populations
It is important to understand if these findings hold when examining each partisanship as a
distinct population for regression specifications. To do so, I ran similar regressions as in
tables nine through twelve169 with the populations of distinct partisans. The dependent
variable utilized was the magnitude of change between a partisan’s first answer and
second answer divided by the first answer. First, I ran the regressions with each
individual in the study as a baseline comparison. In this first regression, receiving the
economic advertisement is significant, individuals update their answer by 74% more after
exposure to the economic advertisement compared to those who receive the
unemployment advertisement. Additionally in the first regression, a participant who
received the immigration advertisement updated their answer by about 470% more after
exposure to the advertisement compared to those who received the unemployment
advertisement.
In the second regression, I utilized the population of any participant who
identified as Republican. An individual who received an immigration advertisement
updated their answer by 1021% more compared to those who do not identify as
169To see regression specifications and the outputs, please see table thirteen in appendix five.
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Republican and received the labor advertisement. Additionally, Republicans update their
answers by 800% less when they receive an immigration advertisement from a Biden
source. This is consistent with each regression output thus far.
In the third regression, I utilized the population of any participant who identified
as a Democrat. An individual who received an immigration advertisement updated their
answer by about 235% more compared to those who do not identify as Democratic and
did not receive the labor advertisement. Additionally, Democrats are statistically
significantly motivated to update their answers after viewing the economic
advertisement, updating their answers by 37% after viewing the economic advertisement
compared to those who do not identify as Democratic and did not receive the economic
advertisement. Finally, Democrats update their answer by 100% more when exposed to a
Biden advertisement regarding the economic topic.
In the fourth regression, I utilized the population of any participant who identified
as neither Republican or Democratic. For this population, both the economic and
immigration advertisements were statistically significant in influencing a participant to
update their second answers; participants updated their answers by 86% and  640%
respectively. However, no other variable was of statistical significance, these participants
were not significantly motivated to update their answer if a politician has their face on an
advertisement, or not.
Overall, this table suggests several key insights — though the main takeaway is
that participants do reason via partisan-motivated reasoning. First, Republicans reason in
a partisan-motivated manner when presented with an advertisement regarding
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immigration; moreover, Republicans distrust Biden, enough to statistically significantly
update their answers when presented with an advertisement from the Biden source.
Second, Democrats reason in a partisan-motivated manner when presented with an
advertisement regarding the economy (about tariffs); Democrats trust Biden, and in turn
they update their answers significantly when presented with an advertisement from the
Biden source. Interestingly, Trump advertisements were never motivating to any
individual of any partisanship, this improves understanding of political advertisements as
this study has uncovered that though partisans do reason in a partisan-motivated fashion,
there is nuance to this reasoning. Consequently, campaigns are now armed with this
suggestion that political advertisements are incredibly efficacious but they must engage in
exploration of understanding which advertisements are efficacious. For example, if an
individual on Trump’s campaign team in the media department created advertisements
with Biden’s face on them with facts about how Biden has been a poor candidate in the
past. Another suggestion gleaned from this experiment is that Republican partisans are
motivated by third-party advertisements, and perhaps the media team could have paid
third-party sources that appear reliable to individuals to advertise positive aspects of
Trump’s presidency, instead of spending millions on Trump-source advertisements.
For robustness, I also analyzed the above regressions with partisan-specific
populations with the dependent variable of change between the first and second answer
divided by the first answer, this allows me to analyze the direction of the update170. The
results in table thirteen are very similar to the output in table fourteen. In sum,
170To see regression specifications and the outputs, please see table fourteen in appendix 5.
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Republicans update their answer negatively when exposed to a Biden advertisement,
especially regarding immigration. Democrats update their answer positively when
exposed to a Biden advertisement, especially regarding immigration. Those who do not
subscribe to a partisanship are not motivated to update their answer in response to an
advertisement with a politician’s face on it. Across each population, individuals updated
their answer upward by a statistically significant amount after viewing an advertisement
regarding immigration.
E. Controls
Thus far, I have not included any controls in my regression specifications, this is due to
the random assignment of participants into the nine treatment groups which varied by
both topic and partisanship. Random assignment is important, as in the real world people
likely self-select into “ideological bubbles”171, in which conservatives consume
information from conservative sources, and vice versa. So, there is a potential that an
observational study of partisan-motivated reasoning would likely be confounded by
selection bias. Given that subjects were randomly assigned to advertisements, the
question thus becomes: does one still need to include demographic “controls”, like
gender, race, education, and political sophistication? I argue that the controls should be
explored in the regressions I have already studied for three reasons. First, covariate
balance in the treatment and control groups may be imperfect given the large number of
stratifications (nine) considered in this study. Second, there is likely self-selection into
171There is a robust literature on ideological bubbles. For a recent source that provides insight into
ideological bubbles, please see: Deborah J. Schildkraut, Jeffrey M. Berry and James M. Glaser,
“Ideological Bubbles and Two Types of Conservatives”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 11 January 2021.
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M-Turk itself, and due to the grant budget, I could not increase the number of participants
surveyed in order to more accurately reflect the population of interest. However, I believe
the most important reason to include these “controls” is that subjects likely have
differential responses to the advertisements according to their partisan affiliations and
demographics. Therefore for a robustness check, I ran each regression that has been
addressed in this equation with controls.
I utilized five controls for each regression. First, I coalesced each of the
sophistication variables into a single additive index. For each sophistication question, I
coded the variable as 1 for the correct answer and 0 if not answered correctly. Thus, the
additive index has values from 0, meaning that the participant answered each question
incorrectly, to 4, meaning that the participant answered each question correctly. A
sophistication control is essential because an individual more familiar with politics may
be more likely to easily interpret the advertisement or have prior knowledge of the
questions that are asked in the treatments.
The next control is gender in order to control for the potential question of “does
gender affect how individuals are influenced by the political advertisements?”, this
question may be particularly salient due to both politicians being male and the tensions
surrounding candidates and women’s issues172. I chose to control for the gender
identification of male, as this was the most common gender in this survey. The next
control, race, may also hold explanatory value due to an election fraught with racial
172For points about Trump and women’s issues, a fair source is: Rachael Bade, Seung Min Kim, and Scott
Clement, “GOP Women Warn of Eroding Support Among Female Voters Amid a ‘Gender Chasm’”, The
Washington Post, 7 August 2020.
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tension and issues173; consequently, one candidate's advertisement may be more appealing
to one racial group over another.
I chose to control for the racial identification of white, as this was the most
common race identified in this survey. Next, I control for age. I created an additive index
variable for individuals who indicated that their age was between 18 and 34, I chose to
control for this age range for two reasons: one, because these two groups encapsulate the
largest share of the population of this survey and, two, because this group is most likely
to be familiar with online advertisements and thus may be able to discern “real” or
“false” information from these advertisements. The last control is education, as there is a
body of literature that points to motivated reasoning and interpretation of advertisements
having an effect on understanding174.  Moreover, education and political sophistication
measure different attributes175. Secondly, an individual with more education may more
easily interpret the advertisements or perhaps have prior knowledge of the subject asked
about in the treatment.
As for testing this robustness check, I first ran the same regressions as table nine
with the controls176. One of the controls was significant in each regression (the 18-34 age
control group) and another was significant in three out of the four regressions
(sophistication score). Importantly, each variable that was significant without the controls
176To see regression specifications and the outputs, please see table fifteen in appendix five.
175The correlation between “education” and “political sophistication” is 0.0140.
174One source that propagates a potentially causal relationship between educational attainment (in this case,
college education) and political sophistication is: Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What
Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
However, it is important to note that this causal relationship is debated in the literature. For a more
skeptical source, see: Benjamin Highton, "Revisiting the Relationship between Educational Attainment and
Political Sophistication", The Journal of Politics 71, no. 4 (2009): 1564-1576.
173For some points describing Trump’s racial comments during his first campaign in 2016, a good source is:
A. Barton Hinkle, “Donald Trump Enables Racism”, Reason Magazine, 16 March 2016.
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is still significant with similar coefficients and unchanged signs. Thus, I am more
confident in making the assertion that there is indeed a relationship between Republican
partisanship and reasoning when viewing political advertisements. Next, I ran the same
regressions as table ten with the controls177. Two of the controls were significant in each
regression; once more, the two significant controls were the 18-34 age group and the
sophistication score. Crucially, each variable that was significant without the controls
remains significant with similar coefficients and unchanged signs. This finding suggests
that there is greater validity to the suggestion that there is a relationship between
Democratic partisanship and partisan-motivated reasoning178.
Finally, I examine a potential explanation for why those who identify with the
Democratic party update their first answer less than conservatives and moderates: those
who identify as Democratic may be more apprised of political news by consuming more
political content on social media, watching more political news on television or listening
to political podcasts, or perhaps these individuals just consume more accurate political
content, thus these individuals have a more accurate first guess and these participants do
not modify their answers by as much as conservatives and moderates179. To test this
newly developed theory, I test the following regression.
179One recent source found: “liberals and liberal/mainstream news consumers are more aware of, positive
toward, and likely to report using fact-checking sites. Conservatives are less positive and conservative news
consumers see such sites as less useful to them … fact-checking sites have a particular appeal to liberals
and liberal/mainstream news consumers”. This quote is from: Craig T. Robertson, Rachel R. Mourão, and
Esther Thorson, "Who Uses Fact-Checking Sites? The Impact of Demographics, Political Antecedents, and
Media Use on Fact-Checking Site Awareness, Attitudes, and Behavior", The International Journal of
Press/politics 25, no. 2 (2020): 217-237.
178For another check of robustness, I also reviewed the direction of participants’ updating with the controls
(please see tables seventeen and eighteen in appendix five). The findings from table nine and ten provide
similar findings to table three and table four.
177To see regression specifications and the outputs, please see table sixteen in appendix five.
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In this regression, I employed the dependent variable of the absolute value of the
participants’ first answer minus the answer provided on the advertisement divided by the
answer provided on the advertisement. “Received economic ad”, “received immigration
ad”, “Self-ID Republican” and “Self-ID Democrat” are defined in the same manner as all
previous regressions.
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Table Nineteen- Testing Participant Error Pre-Advertisement Treatment
This regression suggests no statistical support for my newly developed potential
explanation for why those who identify in line with the Democratic party consistently
update their first answers less than all other examined groups: perhaps these individuals
are just more apprised of political news and, moreover, potentially more accurate
political news. When controlling for the topic of the advertisement received, gender, age
and education level, those who identify with the Democratic party are no more accurate
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initially than their Republican counterparts. This lends even greater support to the notion
that those who identify with the Democratic party update their answers less than those
who identify with the Republican party. With several demographic controls previously
examined, this finding bolsters the claim that there are true partisan differences between
Democrats and Republicans when they are exposed to political content, thus individuals
do reason in a partisan-motivated manner.
F. Advertisement Source and Policy Interactions
For robustness, I included the advertisement source interacted with the policy topic for
regressions one through seven previously analyzed in tables nine and ten; the results and
tables are included in the appendix180. The only additional nuance to my results that can
be garnered by including the interaction of the advertisement source with the policy topic
is in the alternate versions of regressions four and seven — individuals who receive the
Reuters source and the economic topic update their answers less than those who received
the Biden source and the economic topic. This finding lends even further credence to
partisan-motivated reasoning. Moreover, these regressions show that, regardless of their
partisanship, individuals change their minds and update their answers more when they
view the economic topic from the Biden source.
180Please see tables twenty and twenty one in the appendix.
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XII. A Qualitative Method for Understanding  the Efficacy of Political
Advertisements.
An innovative portion of my research study was the open-ended answer requested in the
survey, which asked a participant how he came to the second, final, answer. This was
incredibly interesting because I could not only analyze how many individuals referenced
the advertisement in how they came to their final answer, but also understand variants
beyond just reference of the advertisement in their decision; for example, those who
reference the candidates or news source specifically, if they engaged in motivated
reasoning and updated their answer in response to the information, or if they decided to
just utilize the statistic provided in the advertisement to update exactly to what was
provided in the advertisement.
Below, I isolate each of the nine treatments and discuss trends in the responses
and those who referenced the advertisement and those who resisted utilizing the
advertisement to update their answers. I counted a response as “due to the advertisement”
if the participant mentioned: the candidate or Reuters depending on the treatment
received, the statistic (number) on the advertisement, or the advertisement (in general)
itself. I counted a response as “other” if the participant stated that he guessed, Googled
the information, or utilized an opinion previously held and not updated. As a disclaimer, I
lightly edited the responses for spelling errors and occasionally added information in
brackets for ease in comprehension, however I want to emphasize that all content is
original and true to the actual responses submitted by participants.
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A. Hypothesis Tested
Upon viewing political advertisements, most individuals will engage in motivated
reasoning and update their first responses. This effect can be moderated or heightened
dependent on what information and images an advertisement provides, along with the
source.
B. Trump Advertisements
Advertisements in this study that portrayed President Trump were divisive. Among
individuals who changed their answer when viewing the advertisement, many mentioned
Trump’s character. Though there was indeed passion surrounding Trump’s political
advertisements, and this was made very clear in the responses, quantitatively there was
little statistical evidence that suggested that individuals significantly modify their answers
after exposure to a Trump advertisement. What this evinces is that, though participants
are exposed to a Trump advertisement and write zealous responses to the advertisement,
individuals are largely not motivated to update their answers. This does not discredit
partisan-motivated reasoning; as the quantitative analysis showed, Republican partisans
reason in a partisan-motivated manner when exposed to Biden advertisements. Moreover,
most individuals did update their answers after viewing the advertisements. Below, I
examine the three Trump advertisements.
i. Trump Labor Topic (Unemployment Rate)
This treatment yielded results that support my overall hypothesis for this thesis. On the
whole, 82% of individuals modified their answers after viewing the advertisement and
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37% of the total treatment population submitted their second answer as exactly the
statistic presented in the advertisement. This suggests that political advertisements are
indeed efficacious. Examining the open-ended responses, 51% of those who received this
treatment mentioned the advertisement when writing about how they came to their final
answers. Many responses lent themselves to supporting the quantitative results,
individuals had a strong reaction to viewing the Trump advertisements, and in turn were
not motivated to update their responses. One individual pointed out that “Trump lies.
Most people gave up looking for work”, and another, “Most of what Trump promised did
not happen”. Responses such as these give credence to the notion that perhaps individuals
would not be motivated to change their responses significantly after exposure to a Trump
advertisement.
Beyond focusing on the source of the advertisement being from Trump’s
campaign, individuals often referenced how they engaged in motivated reasoning upon
viewing the advertisement. A participant wrote about he181 utilized past information
known and new information learned upon viewing the advertisement: “I took the average
of my guess and the unemployment rate stated in the advertisement”. Participants also
confirmed the efficacy of the political advertisements, as they utilized the advertisements
as a heuristic when developing their second answer. One participant wrote, “I guessed
based on what that advertisement said because I didn't know on my own”. Another
participant wrote that there was such trust in the advertisement that he utilized the
181I utilize “he” here as a basic reference to refer to a singular, individual participant. This is not necessarily
the gender of the participant. I intend to reveal no identifying characteristics, even gender, about the
participants.
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statistic even though it differed from his past knowledge: “I looked at what the statistic
was as opposed to what I thought”.
In line with motivated reasoning, many participants wrote that they drew on past
political knowledge gleaned from the news and cogitated this with the advertisement
viewed, “I'm just trying to recall what I heard about unemployment rates, so it's a best
guess”. Finally, there were still some individuals who were not convinced by the
advertisement and instead, as one individual put it, “just went with my gut feeling”. In
sum, this treatment does support the quantitative findings regarding the Trump
advertisements, individuals have a visceral reaction (positively or negatively) but do not
update their answers solely due to seeing Trump’s face; the content and topic of the
advertisement is more important than the source when considering the Trump source.
ii. Trump Economic Topic (Tariffs)
This treatment also provided a qualitative story that supported my quantitative findings.
On the whole, 90% of individuals modified their answers after viewing the advertisement
and 47% of the total treatment population submitted their second answer as exactly the
statistic presented in the advertisement. This suggests that political advertisements are
indeed efficacious. Examining the open-ended responses, 56% of those who received this
treatment mentioned the advertisement when writing about how they came to their final
answers. However, several participants who received this treatment indicated that
Trump’s character made them uncertain about updating their results, this is in-line with
the quantitative results. One participant colorfully wrote: “I know he's a bullshitter and
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talks himself up. Wouldn’t surprise me if the number was 0”. Some individuals pointed to
the Republican party at large as the reason participants do not update their answers after
exposure to the advertisement, “Usually right-wing propaganda material tends to
exaggerate figures”. However, some individuals who did identify as Republican relied on
the source of the advertisement and Trump’s face to update their answers, “Trump is very
trustworthy, so I trust his estimate”.
Some participants drew on past knowledge garnered from the source’s campaign
material to come to their second answer, “while much of his campaign material was
dishonest, I used the number in the advertisement”; others drew on information recalled
from the media and news sources, “I somewhat heard it in the media”. Many individuals
did reference the statistic in the advertisement, reinforcing the theory that political
advertisements are indeed effective. One participant noted, “Since I saw the number 14
billion on the message I was influenced by that”. Another discussed their reasoning in
relation to the statistic on the advertisement, “I took my original guess and split it in half
due to the statement that was made about 14 billion being collected. I am still pretty sure
that my original guess was closer to the actual amount”.
Still, there was a minority of individuals who did not change their answers after
viewing the advertisement and were not persuaded by the advertisement, as one
individual wrote, “I just guessed, didn't use any logic”. Overall, this treatment reinforced
the quantitative findings in this research; this provides validity not only to the
quantitative findings but also my hypotheses put forth, as this treatment is in-line with the
labor topic Trump treatment.
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iii. Trump Immigration Topic (Immigration Population)
The immigration topic was certainly divisive, especially in this treatment with the
advertisement from the Trump source. This treatment showcased my quantitative findings
in a qualitative manner: individuals were incredibly motivated to update their answers
due to the topic of the advertisement. In this treatment 88% of individuals modified their
answers after viewing the advertisement and 43% of the total treatment population
submitted their second answer as exactly the statistic presented in the advertisement.
Moreover, 62% of those who received this treatment mentioned the advertisement when
writing about how they came to their final answers. Partisan motivated-reasoning was
engaged in the opposite manner expected, more individuals did not trust Trump,
especially those who identified as Democratic, and thus did not update their answers due
to the source. One participant succinctly stated this notion, “If Trump says 45 million, it
must be a lie he's using to scare up his xenophobic base. So while my guess of 9 is
probably lowballing, an assertion from Donald Trump makes me unwilling to consider it
to be significantly higher than that”. Similarly, another participant wrote, “I just thought I
had read that at one point.  I certainly wouldn't use anything with Trump’s picture on it to
change my mind”.
A participant wrote in the open-ended response the partisan-motivated reasoning
that did not encourage an update due to the Trump source: “After I read the Trump
advertisement stating there was 45 million, I assumed that number was exaggerated by
about 50%”. A common phenomenon in this study was individuals who engaged in
partisan-motivated reasoning by recalling political news consumed at an earlier point
110
prior to this survey. “I figured that there are about 400 million people in the United
States, and I thought that an estimate that 10% of the population is immigrants was
reasonable. This brought me to an estimate of 40,000,000 immigrants in the U.S.”.
Finally, some just relied on campaign slogans as heuristics to develop their final answer:
“Make America great”. In sum, this treatment aided in substantiating the quantitative
evidence that though an advertisement topic can be powerful in encouraging an
individual to modify their answer, the source and partisanship interaction is crucial to
eliciting a statistically significant update.
C. Biden Advertisements
Advertisements in this study that portrayed President Biden were also polarizing. Among
individuals who changed their answer when viewing the advertisement, many mentioned
Biden and his Democratic affiliation. Not only did the Biden advertisements command
individual’s attention, they were also significant in causing a participant to modify their
answers, this was seen most clearly with the immigration topic; Biden advertisements
managed to engender partisan-motivated reasoning with a statistically significant result,
Democrats trusted Biden and Republicans distrusted Biden. This may be understood as
informing future media campaigns that the source and the topic can be indicative of a
significantly updated response. For example, individuals who identified as Republican
did utilize partisan-motivated reasoning when exposed to Biden advertisements, but not
Trump advertisements to the same degree, thus the media team could have relied on
negative Biden advertisements to potentially elicit more support for Trump. Again, an
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overwhelming majority of each Biden treatment did update their answers after exposure
to the advertisements. Below, I examine the three Biden advertisements.
i. Biden Labor Topic (Unemployment Rate)
This treatment induced 78% of individuals to change their first answers after viewing the
advertisement and 37% of individuals submitted their second answer as exactly the
statistic presented in the advertisement. In line with the Trump labor topic question,
individuals changed their answer less than the other two treatments, this is also reflected
in the quantitative evidence. Moreover, in the open-ended questions, 59% mentioned the
advertisement when writing about how they came to their final answers.  Among
individuals who changed their answer when viewing the advertisement, many mentioned
how Biden’s image influenced their beliefs about the credibility of the information. For
example, one individual utilized Biden’s image and message to modify their first
response and took Biden’s advertisement at face value: “Joe Biden’s message said that
was the unemployment rate at the end of 2019”.
There was also a stark divide between individuals who trusted Biden and
distrusted Biden, this was also reflected in the quantitative findings. An individual wrote
about how they did not trust Biden, and updated their response accordingly: “As with
anything associated with Biden, he would try and lowball this answer. But my initial
guess seemed low to me, even before I viewed the advertisement”. In contrast, another
participant stated their trust for Biden influenced their answer: “I trust Joe Biden, so I
believe the number that he quoted in his advertisement”. Individuals utilized the
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advertisement as a heuristic and changed their first answer to the advertisement statistic,
either for ease in understanding the question posed in the survey, or due to being
convinced by the advertisement. One participant wrote, “I had guessed 4 percent and the
advertisement was at 3.7. I was going to average them, but I went with the advertisement
just to save time”; this lends credence to the theory that political advertisements are
indeed efficacious and can be utilized to inform individuals who view the advertisement.
A common occurrence in this treatment and previous treatments is individuals
drawing on past information learned and interpreting the advertisement in light of the
information acquired. One participant disclosed, “I thought about what I remembered it to
be and took into consideration the stats in the picture [advertisement] I saw”. Other
individuals, though the majority did change their first answer, were not convinced by the
advertisements and utilized other methods of reasoning and past information to form a
second answer. “I went with my gut instincts and what I know about unemployment from
the news right now”. Overall, this treatment provided insight into the statistically
significant findings from the quantitative section, that Democrats and Republicans both
utilized partisan-motivated reasoning significantly when viewing Biden advertisements
and that the labor topic did not elicit motivation to the scale that the economic and
immigration topic did.
ii. Biden Economic Topic (Tariffs)
My hypothesis was once again supported when examining the tariffs question with the
Biden advertisement provided. For this treatment in particular, 82% of individuals
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changed their first answers after viewing the advertisement and 50% of respondents
submitted their second answer as exactly the statistic presented in the advertisement.
Furthermore, 64% of those who received this treatment mentioned the advertisement
when writing about how they came to their final answers. With this treatment,
participants seemed to draw on their emotions more and referenced President Biden and
his character more often than in past treatments analyzed when expounding upon their
final answer, thus this treatment lent itself to bolstering the theory of partisan-motivated
reasoning; the economic topic, as seen in the quantitative analysis, was not as powerful a
motivator as the immigration topic. One participant wrote, “I figured if Joe Biden said it,
it was a lie so it had to be more, but I don't think it would be a lot more”. Another, more
harsh response was, “I am just guessing and do not really know. Neither does the clown
Biden”. Other participants were more confident in Biden’s informational guidance from
the advertisement. One participant reasoned, “I was guided by what Biden said, because
the exact number is difficult to find in the current press”.
Participants were also divided about whether or not to trust the advertisement
based solely on the fact that Biden was the source. On one hand, a individual wrote, “I
think my first guess was too low and the political message isn't reliable for accurate
information so I went a bit higher than the advertisement”. On the other hand, another
participant wrote plainly, “I trusted what the advertisement said”. Others did not mention
Biden and just focused on the information and statistic that are presented in the
advertisement, utilizing what had been learned to develop an updated second answer, like
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one participant’s response: “I considered what I could remember about tariffs and picked
a closer to mid-point position with what the political advertisement claimed”.
In a similar vein, participants utilized the statistic in the advertisement for ease in
comprehending the question; some just took the advertisement at face value and updated
to exactly the statistic provided. One participant expressed, “I used the advertisement
because I honestly have no idea”. A reliance on past knowledge garnered from political
news is seen in many responses : “I read before that it's [the tariff amount is] $20 billion”.
In sum, this treatment reinforced the idea that a partisan identification and the
source of the advertisement can be powerful in explaining how an individual engages in
partisan-motivated reasoning and  updates their answers. Moreover, it adds a robustness
to the quantitative results as the qualitative results are in-line with the findings.
iii. Biden Immigration Topic (Immigration Population)
Across all sources of advertisements, the immigration topic encouraged the largest
updating, and in a positive direction, meaning that individuals modified their answers by
a large amount after exposure to the advertisements. As shown in the quantitative results,
those who identify as Democratic update their answers statistically significantly when
they receive a Biden advertisement; these individuals modify their answers by about
220% less than participants who did not identify with the Democratic party and received
the unemployment rate advertisements. However, individuals who identify as Republican
and received the Biden Immigration advertisement updated their answer by about 800%
less.
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For this treatment in particular, 87% of individuals changed their first answers
after viewing the advertisement and 46% of individuals submitted their second answer as
exactly the statistic presented in the advertisement. Furthermore, 65% of those who
received this treatment mentioned the advertisement when writing about how they came
to their final answers. Many brought up Biden and his character when determining the
validity of the information and when considering the formation of the second answer. For
example, “I read what Joe Biden had said and chose his answer”, and in the opposite
direction, “I assumed Biden was likely lying”. Still others could not divorce another
politician from the immigration question when considering their second answer; “I
assume that some of the immigrants have left due to Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant
policies and rhetoric”.
Motivated reasoning was employed again as individuals reckoned with their prior
knowledge and political news exposure, and the declarations on the advertisement. One
participant remarked, “I started at 30 million and then the political advertisement I was
shown said it was 45 million, so I somewhat split the difference on what I thought”.
In sum, this treatment showcases partisan-motivated reasoning well, individuals
were clearly polarized by the Biden immigration advertisement and, as quantitatively
shown, statistically significantly so. Furthermore, I would argue that advertisements are
indeed efficacious to more than the target audience; an advertisement can deeply
influence partisans of either party affiliation.
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D. Reuters Advertisements
I utilized the three Reuters advertisements in this study to act as a control of sorts: how
do individuals that identify with a political party reason when exposed to neutral
information in an advertisement? Moreover, are these advertisements just as efficacious?
The Reuters advertisements proved to be incredibly effective, with many participants
updating their answers more when exposed to the Reuters advertisements compared to
some of the partisan advertisements. As seen in the quantitative evidence, many of those
participants who identified as Republican were very motivated to update their answers in
response to the Reuters advertisements. Participants who received the Reuters
advertisements often referenced the source and the “trustworthiness” of Reuters.
I contend that the case for partisan-motivated reasoning is very secure, as
individuals did not identify their partisanship or politicians when confronted with
partisan-neutral information. Once again, the theory was that individuals engaged in
partisan-motivated reasoning when confronted with partisan-slanted information. Below,
I discuss the three Reuters advertisements.
i. Reuters Labor Topic (Unemployment Rate)
This treatment cultivated support for my overall hypothesis. For this treatment in
particular, 83% of individuals changed their first answers after viewing the advertisement
and 55% of individuals submitted their second answer as exactly the statistic presented in
the advertisement; this treatment had the most participants update their answers to be the
statistic in the advertisement out of any treatment in this study. When considering the
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open-ended responses, 67% of those who received this treatment mentioned the
advertisement when writing about how they came to their final answers. A trend in the
responses in this treatment was participants mentioning the trust in the Reuters news
source and updating due to this trust. One participant wrote, “I trusted the news source
because I'm familiar with it and expect the results to be accurate”; another participant
expressed, “I believe Reuters over my personal guess”.
Many participants referenced remembering an unemployment statistic in the news
and relied on past information from the news along with the information from the
advertisement. One participant reasoned that he came upon his answer by, “the news and
[what was] reported via the graphic [advertisement] I just saw”. Importantly with this
treatment, there was virtually no debate about the veracity of the source, Reuters. Instead,
some participants contemplated that Reuters may not be wholly correct due to it just
being one source, this is encapsulated by one participant’s response: “I sort of trust
Reuters but since they're just one source I decided to just guess closer to their figure”.
Other participants were concerned that the unemployment rate may have changed since
2019 due to the COVID-19, though the question only asked about what the
unemployment rate was at the end of 2019. One individual recalled that they updated
their answer and did not conform with the advertisement, “due to corona, [the]
unemployment percentage increased”.
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ii. Reuters Economic Topic (Tariffs)
The results from this treatment are very similar to the labor topic Reuters treatment.
There were recurring themes of trust in the newsource and reasoning that took into
account the past knowledge garnered from media and news. Statistically, 87% of
individuals changed their first answers after viewing the advertisement and 52% of
individuals submitted their second answer as exactly the statistic presented in the
advertisement. As for the open-ended response, 61% of those who received this treatment
mentioned the advertisement when writing about how they came to their final answers.
Again, the Reuters advertisement commanded a strong percentage of participants who
submitted their second answer as the statistic on the advertisement and participants who
recalled the advertisement in their open-ended responses.
Individuals mention the validity of the statistic and the source more often than
those who received the Biden or Trump advertisements. One individual plainly wrote,
“the number came from a reputable news source”, another commented, “I assumed that
the advertisement from Reuters had the correct figure”. Others utilized the advertisement
to develop an original statistic that is distinct from a participant’s first answer and from
the advertisement statistic: “I just slightly increased the amount given by the source
(Reuters) as I assume the amount of tariffs went up somewhat compared to that time
period”. Individuals again utilized the advertisement and statistic as a heuristic and just
updated to exactly what the statistic put forth. An intriguing response explains an
individual’s emotions regarding this heuristic: “It was just exactly that: a guess. Smaller
numbers felt too small, and larger numbers were scary”.
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iii. Reuters Immigration Topic (Immigration Population)
In forming a second answer, Reuters continued to be a beacon of trustworthy news that
individuals believed they could rely on. My hypothesis held true for this treatment as
well, as individuals again updated in a distinct manner than when presented with partisan
information. The results of this treatment were similar to the labor and economic
treatments. For this treatment in particular, 89% of individuals changed their first answers
after viewing the advertisement and 46% of individuals submitted their second answer as
exactly the statistic presented in the advertisement. Finally, 60% of those who received
this treatment mentioned the advertisement when writing about how they came to their
final answers.
This treatment again elicited responses that were dependent on emotional
indicators of “trust” and “reliability” that Reuters prompted: “Reuters is a trustworthy
news source and then [the advertisement] said there were 45 million immigrants in the
U.S..” Individuals still relied on past information and data known via political news when
reasoning in a more Bayesian manner to come to their updated answer. One response
was, “last year I was reading an article and it mentioned the amount of immigrants in the
U.S. as 44.7, so [the advertisement’s statistic of] 45 million [immigrants] today would be
somewhat correct”.
In sum, I contend that all Reuters treatments were in-line with the quantitative
evidence presented earlier. Individuals updated their answers by a large amount, but did
not engage with partisanship or politics when discussing why they updated their answer.
This is also in-line with my hypothesis, as these participants were not presented with
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partisan-slanted information and thus they did not engage with partisan-motivated
reasoning. Instead, it appears that individuals drew on Bayesian updating when
developing their second answer.
121
XIII. Discussion and Conclusion
In order to further understanding about partisan-motivated reasoning, I examined political
advertisements with a quantitative and a qualitative approach. I utilized original survey
data to investigate four principle questions about the relationship between
partisan-motivated reasoning, political advertisements, and comprehensively, the
efficaciousness of political advertisements. First, are political advertisements effective?
Second, who is most susceptible to online advertising? Third, do individuals utilize
partisan-motivated reasoning when presented with partisan-slanted information? Finally,
if individuals do engage in partisan-motivated reasoning, do individuals of differing
partisanships understand partisan-slanted information in the same manner?
My survey and analysis answer the questions that I put forth at the beginning of
this thesis. To address the question, are political advertisements effective?, I turn to the
evidence from the regression outputs. The economic topic was significant in nearly every
regression and the immigration topic was significant with large coefficients in every
regression at the 99% confidence interval. Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis, that
political advertisements have no impact on an individual’s beliefs and do not encourage
an updating of answers. My finding is in-line with the established literature. Kendall,
Nannicini and Trebbi182 showed that receiving a policy message from a politician was
effective in motivating an update in an individual’s opinion about the policy topic, the
candidate who was the source of the message, and the candidate’s opponent. Lee Kaid
and Postelnicu183 examined early online political advertisements and found that
183"Political Advertising in the 2004 Election" (2005).
182"How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign" (2015).
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politicians who utilized online advertisements were more well-known, and this in turn
encouraged individuals to seek out more information about the candidate. I believe my
research is supportive of Lee Kaid and Postelnicu’s findings, and it also provides a
refinement on the authors’ research; individuals are motivated by advertisements, but one
must take into account an individual's partisanship and the topic and source of the
advertisement to assess effectiveness. Vargo and Hopp184 utilized a more modern platform
for political advertisements, Facebook and Instagram, and found that political
advertisements were more efficacious than advertisements of other topics and encouraged
online-engagement. The findings from this research can be incorporated with Vargo and
Hopp’s findings, as the quantitative and qualitative evidence has clearly shown that
individuals are incredibly likely to be influenced by a political advertisement to some
degree, and my research provided further refinement of which partisans are most affected
by the sources and topics of the advertisements.
In evaluating the accuracy of “the efficacy of advertisement” hypothesis, which
stated that political advertisements will be effective in inducing a reformation of
understanding and affect a change in participants’ first answer, regardless of partisanship,
I argue that I can reject the null hypothesis185. Quantitatively, over 85% of individuals
changed their responses in response to the political advertisements and more than 31% of
individuals put forth their modified answers as the same statistic presented in the
advertisement. Moreover, the regression results indicate that individuals update their
185The null hypothesis being that political advertisements have no effect in inducing a change in a
participant's response.
184"Fear, Anger, and Political Advertisement Engagement: A Computational Case Study of Russian-Linked
Facebook and Instagram Content" (2020).
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answers significantly in response to the immigration advertisements and nearly always
significantly in response to the economic advertisements. I believe that political
advertisements, in this study, exceed expectations in terms of efficaciousness.
My research also provided insight into which individuals are most motivated to
update their responses significantly after exposure to political advertisements. I found
that those who identify with a political partisanship significantly update their responses
after viewing advertisements, however this hinges on the topic and the source of the
advertisements. This also speaks to the third question, do individuals engage in
partisan-motivated reasoning? I would argue that, yes, individuals do engage in
partisan-motivated reasoning. This is exhibited by the finding that those who identify as
Democratic or Republican update their answers by different magnitudes and in different
directions. Republicans are not motivated to update their responses by a large magnitude
when exposed to advertisements from the Biden source and update their answers
negatively when viewing the advertisements from Biden. Democrats are motivated to
update their responses when exposed to Biden advertisements and increase both the
magnitude of their response and update their answers in the positive direction. Partisans
seem to engage in motivated reasoning when exposed to the Biden source
advertisements, but not the Trump source advertisements. Thus, I have statistically
significant suggestive evidence that individuals are, one, motivated to update their
responses after exposure to political advertisements, and, two, individuals do indeed
engage in partisan-motivated reasoning. That Democrats and Republicans do reason in a
partisan-motivated manner, and moreover that partisans who support different parties
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reason in different ways; this allows me to attend to my last research question put forth in
this thesis, if partisans do indeed reason in different manners when exposed to
partisan-slanted information. I would contend that both the quantitative and the
qualitative evidence easily lend itself to the answer of this question being “yes”.
The answers that I have garnered in response to these questions are in-line with
motivated reasoning and the contrasting interpretations of the advertisements by
partisans. Franz and Ridout186 argued that when partisans receive messages that are
in-line with their partisan identification, individuals are more likely to believe these
messages than messages that are inconsistent with their partisanship. In my study, this
was exemplified by Democrats being highly motivated to update their response after
exposure to a Biden advertisement and not significantly updating their response after
exposure to a Trump advertisement. As for Republicans, though they were not motivated
by partisan-conforming advertisements, they were motivated to update their answers after
receiving partisan incongruent information; I argue that this finding may also be placed
in-line with Franz and Ridout’s results as Republicans did not believe Biden source
advertisements.
Moreover, my findings are in-line with Kunda’s research, which found that
“people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to
construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate
observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence
necessary to support it”187. I believe that my findings from the qualitative research portion
187"The Case for Motivated Reasoning" (1990).
186"Does Political Advertising Persuade?" (2003).
125
are in accordance with Kunda. Individuals purported that they modified their answers due
to the “evidence” acquired from viewing the advertisements, with many individuals citing
the statistics presented in the advertisements and the, at the time, Presidential hopefuls
(the sources of the advertisements) as reasons they were convinced to update their
answers. When political advertisements engaged with an individual’s engrained
partisanship, the advertisements acted as a sounding board — the advertisements
provided the evidence needed to arrive at “their desired conclusion” of the information
they were presented with. This notion also speaks to Bolsen et al’s findings188, that
partisan-motivated reasoning can aid in explaining how individuals develop opinions
about policies, in Bolsen et al.’s study, “the source of political information and the
motivation underlying individuals’ opinion formation process”, this finding can be
interpolated to political advertisements and this thesis’ findings; the source of the
advertisements and the partisan-motivation was crucial in understanding the participants’
decision formation process regarding updating their prior beliefs (answers).
Examining the “partisan significance” hypothesis, which puts forth that: those
who identify with the political party of the advertisement source will update their first
answers by a larger amount compared to those who do not identify with the political
partisanship (the party). I assert that this hypothesis found strong support in both my
quantitative and qualitative evidence, and thus I do reject the null hypothesis189.
Quantitatively, those who identified with a political party, “partisans”, update their
189The null hypothesis being that partisans who are committed to the party (including identifying with the
political party and being ideologically in-line with the political party) update their answers in response to
the political advertisements no more than an individual who is not committed to a political party (not a
partisan).
188"The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion" (2013). Italics the authors’ own.
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responses by a statistically significant amount in a statistically significant direction
dependent on their partisanship. As shown in table thirteen, individuals who did not
identify with a partisanship, though motivated to update their responses purely due to
exposure to the advertisements, did not meet statistical significance thresholds when
taking into account the topic or the source of the advertisements. Qualitatively, a majority
of individuals who mentioned the advertisements in the open-ended responses discussed
the politician or the party when reasoning about their second answer.
Next, I will assess the “partisan confidence” hypothesis, which stated: participants
who identify with the political source of the advertisement will be more likely to modify
their first answer than when exposed to an advertisement from the source of the
contrasting political partisanship. I found support for this hypothesis when examining
those who identified with the Republican party. Republicans were not motivated to
update their answers after exposure to their partisan-conforming advertisements (the
Trump source advertisements), but they did update their answers significantly when
exposed to the partisan-nonconforming advertisements (the Biden source
advertisements)190. But when examining the participants who identify with the
Democratic party, these participants updated their answers in response to the
partisan-confirming advertisements (the Biden source advertisements) not the partisan-
nonconfirming advertisements (the Trump source advertisements). Therefore, I do reject
the null hypothesis191. I believe in investigating this theory, it has shed a nuanced light on
191The null hypothesis being that partisans modify their answers by a non-significant amount when exposed
to an advertisement from any source.
190Again, this is dependent on the topic of the advertisements as well.
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how partisanship influences the revision of a participant’s response, and furthermore, the
partisan-interpretation of political advertisements.
Finally, I consider the “partisanship is king” hypothesis, which stated:
partisanship cues are the most salient indications of an impetus to modify a participant’s
first answer. From a quantitative perspective, I am able to reject the null hypothesis192.
Though the age group and the sophistication score of a participant was generally
significant across treatments and regression specifications193, I argue that these
demographic controls do not provide a causal argument for why participants were
motivated to update their answers, though these results do suggest that those who are
between the ages of 18 and 34 update their answers more compared to those who do not
fall in this age range and those who possess a higher sophistication score update their
answers less compared to those who have a lower sophistication score. As for the age
control holding significance, I contend that this may be due to this age group having more
experience with the internet and online political advertisements and thus are more
familiar with the format and exposure, and thus are more motivated to update their
answers more. As for the sophistication score, there is a body of literature that discusses
the implications of political sophistication, motivated reasoning, political information,
and voting. I will engage in a brief exploration of the literature of political sophistication
and its relation to the salient topics of this paper.
193See tables fifteen (Table fifteen: Testing Republican Partisan Identification and Magnitude of Answer
Change with Controls) and sixteen (Table Sixteen: Testing Democratic Partisan Identification and
Magnitude of Answer Change with Controls.) When considering the direction of the update, only the age
group of the demographic controls is significant.
192The null hypothesis being that partisanship is not salient when considering attributes of a participant; an
individual updates their answer significantly due to a gender, race, age or another demographic feature.
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Specifically regarding advertisements, Stevens contends that “individuals lower in
political sophistication gain little or no information from negative advertising. In contrast,
higher sophisticates gain a great deal of information”194. When studying the relationship
between political sophistication and advertisements, Christenson postulated195:
Individuals with low sophistication use ads as substitutes for information seeking,
feel they have enough information to choose a candidate regardless of exposure to
ads, generally do not participate in politics, learn nothing directly from campaign
ads and yet manage to vote more correctly when exposed to ads. Contrarily, high
sophisticates seek out large amounts of campaign information and vote very
consistently regardless of exposure to campaigns, appear capable of turning
campaign ads into modest gains in real political information, have higher rates of
participation in campaign politics and are less likely to feel they have insufficient
information to make a vote choice when exposed to campaign ads.
When studying political sophistication and its relation to motivated reasoning,
Vegetti and Mancosu196 found that:
people tend to perceive all partisan-consistent news as more plausible, but
political sophisticates are better able to tell real from false news … while political
information is generally affected by motivated reasoning, political sophistication
can effectively reduce citizens’ chances to fall for false information.
Hartman and Newmark also studied motivated reasoning and political sophistication, and
analyzed if individuals “associate Obama with Islam or are motivated reasoners who
simply express negativity about the president” via an implicit association test (IAT)197.
Hartman and Newmark found that “predispositions such as ideology, partisanship, and
race affect how citizens feel about Obama, which in turn motivates them to accept
197Todd K. Hartman and Adam J. Newmark, "Motivated Reasoning, Political Sophistication, and
Associations between President Obama and Islam", PS, Political Science & Politics 45, no. 3 (2012): 449.
196Federico Vegetti and Moreno Mancosu, "The Impact of Political Sophistication and Motivated Reasoning
on Misinformation", Political Communication 37, no. 5 (2020): 678.
195Dino P. Christenson, “The Electoral Intersection: Information and Context”, PhD dissertation, The Ohio
State University, 2010, iii.
194Daniel Stevens, "Separate and Unequal Effects: Information, Political Sophistication and Negative
Advertising in American Elections", Political Research Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2005): 413.
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misinformation about the president … political sophistication does not appear to
inoculate citizens from exposure to misinformation, as they exhibit the same IAT effect as
less knowledgeable individuals”198.
Similarly, Goren asserts that, across policy areas, individuals of different levels of
sophistication “are structured coherently and equivalently in the minds of citizens at
different levels of sophistication”199. Moreover, Goren contends that, “political
sophistication does not systematically enhance the impact these principles have on policy
preferences”200. As for polarization, “individuals of all sophistication levels have become
more likely to identify with and vote for the party that best matches their policy
orientations as a function of increasing elite-level polarization”201.
I contend that in light of the relationship between political advertisements and
sophistication, my findings are in-line with Stevens and Christenson. Those with a higher
political sophistication score updated their answers by less compared to those with a
lower score and the amount they did update was in the negative direction. Thus,
sophisticates were able to utilize the information provided in the political advertisements
to update their answers in a thoughtful manner, reducing their answers and considering
their responses; this is suggested due to the significance of the variable. Additionally, the
high sophisticates were able to turn their newfound political knowledge from the
advertisements into an updated answer. And as Hartman and Newmark put forth,
201Joshua N. Zingher and Michael E. Flynn, "Does Polarization Affect Even the Inattentive? Assessing the
Relationship between Political Sophistication, Policy Orientations, and Elite Cues", Electoral Studies 57
(2019): 131.
200Ibid., 462.
199Paul Goren, "Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration", American Journal of
Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004): 462.
198Ibid., 449.
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“political sophistication can effectively reduce citizens’ chances to fall for false
information”.
Research garners power when it produces practical uses with broad applicability. I
titled this thesis, The $2.3 Billion Dollar Question: Do Political Advertisements Work?
This is a lofty question that is unable to be answered with a single research design and a
single thesis. However, this thesis can provide suggestions regarding the efficacy of
political advertisements and which individuals are most inclined to update their prior
beliefs when exposed to advertisements. When placed in a real-world context, I return to
the state of spending on political advertisements in the 2020 election discussed at the
beginning of this thesis. With billions of dollars at stake, providing more insight into
political advertisements is crucial. In response to this title, I offer research that is
suggestive of an affirmative answer: yes, political advertisements do work. However, this
answer comes with stipulations. First, the topic of the advertisement, along with the
source, are crucial in inducing an update in viewers of the advertisement. Second, and
arguably the most important, partisanship matters — partisanship is the essential factor in
targeting advertisements to individuals who are inclined to update their beliefs about the
candidate and the policy topic and individuals of differing partisanships do respond to
political advertisements in discrete ways. Presidential elections in America have always
inhabited a bellicose political atmosphere, and in 2020, the election was capricious with
the favored candidate to win the nation’s highest held elected position sometimes varying
by the day. Political advertisements are a powerful way to reach a targeted population of
individuals that potentially have the capability to turn an election.
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Of course, the study of political advertisements and voting behavior is a
constantly updating field of study.  To further the research put forth in this thesis, I
recommend several suggestions. First, a larger number of participants in the study would
lend itself to bolstering external validity, as would administering the survey on different
platforms such as Qualtrics and in-person surveys. Alternatively, one could conduct a
longitudinal study; this may include resurveying a sample of individuals over Presidential
election cycles with advertisements of candidates in forthcoming elections to understand
how reactions to advertisements change and how individuals update their responses over
a period of time. Additionally, implementing voter identification would be an interesting
measure to consider in the survey to attempt to parse out actual effects of advertisements
both from the survey and in exposure to political advertisements outside of the survey.
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APPENDIX ONE: RECRUITMENT FORM AND CONSENT FORM.
Principal Investigator: Olivia Leone ocl@bu.edu BA/MA candidate, Student.
Academic Advisor: Dr. Dino Christenson dinopc@bu.edu
Version Date: Current, December 10, 2020.
The Purpose of the Research Study: The purpose of this research study is to
understand the effect of political advertisements and partisanship on those in the United
States. This may further our understanding of information and reasoning in relation to
political content. Participation is voluntary and should take about 5 minutes.
Participants taking part in this research study will take a brief pre-survey questionnaire
of 14 questions asking basic demographic information, including: age, education and
race. Next, you will be asked a question related to current politics that is from 2018-
2019 regarding the economy, foreign affairs or immigration. Then, you will be shown an
advertising message. After, you will be asked a question that is from 2018-2019 again
regarding the economy, foreign affairs or immigration. Finally, you will be asked to input
a randomly generated number into MTurk and complete a reCAPTCHA.
We will assign you by chance (like a coin toss) to one of nine study groups. You and the
researcher cannot choose your study group. You will have an equal chance of being
assigned to either study group. A study group refers to the advertisement that you will
receive. Thus, each study group will:
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• complete the pre-survey questionnaire,
• be asked one question related to current politics in the field of economy, foreign
affairs or immigration depending on your study group,
• be shown one of nine advertisements, and then asked a question related to
current politics in the same area previously asked about.
Participation carries with it a small risk of loss of confidentiality.
Introduction
Please read this form carefully. The purpose of this form is to provide you with important
information about taking part in a research study. If you have any questions about the
research or any portion of this form, please ask us. Taking part in this research study is
up to you.
The person in charge of this study is Olivia Leone, BA/MA candidate and Student.
Leone’s faculty advisor is Dr. Dino Christenson. Leone can be reached at ocl@bu.edu.
Christenson can be reached at dinopc@bu.edu. Leone will be referred to as the
“researcher” throughout this form.
What should I know about a research study?
Participation in research is voluntary, which means that it is something for which you
volunteer. It is your choice to participate in the study, or not to participate. If you choose
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to participate now, you may change your mind and stop participating later. You may skip
any question for any reason.
Why is this study being done?
We are asking you to take part in this study because you are on Amazon’s MTurk
platform and can provide valuable insight for political science research.
About 900 subjects will take part in this research study at Boston University that is
conducted online via Amazon’s MTurk.
This data will be analyzed and be utilized in the researcher’s thesis, which will be
concluded in April 2021.
Who is Funding the Study?
This study is funded by Boston University’s Weinstein Grant.
What are the risks of taking part in this research study?
Loss of Confidentiality
The main risk of allowing us to use and store your information for research is a potential
loss of privacy. We will protect your privacy, your MTurk worker identification, by
labeling your information with a code and keeping the key to the code in a
password-protected computer. Although the PI will not ask for any personal private
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information, such as your name or email address, please be aware that any work
performed on Amazon Mturk can potentially be linked to information about you on your
Amazon public profile page, depending on the settings you have for your Amazon
profile. The PI will not be accessing any personally identifying information about you
that you may have put on your Amazon public profile page.
Questionnaire/Survey Risks
You may be uncomfortable with some of the questions and topics we will ask about. You
do not have to answer any questions that make you feel uncomfortable.
Are there any benefits from being in this research study?
Others, such as those in political science research, may benefit in the future from the
information that is learned in this study.
What alternatives are available?
You may choose not to take part in this research study.
How Will You Keep My Records Confidential?
We will protect your privacy, your MTurk worker identification, and your responses, by
labeling your information with a code and keeping the key to the code in a
password-protected computer. Additionally, I will turn off the IP address option on
Qualtrics, therefore further protecting anonymity.
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We will make every effort to keep your records confidential. Those who may have access
to your data include:
● The Researcher and academic advisor.
● The Institutional Review Board at Boston University.
The Institutional Review Board is a group of people who review human research studies
for safety and protection of people who take part in the studies.
Private information collected from you during this study will NOT be used for future
research studies or shared with other researchers for future research, even if the
information identifying you are removed from the private information.
Payment
We will pay you $1 via Amazon’s MTurk site upon completion of the survey. If you do
not complete the survey entirely, you will not receive the payment.
There are no costs to you for taking part in this research study.
Who do I ask if I have questions or concerns about this research study?





Available Monday through Friday 9 am to 5pm.
Faculty advisor: Dr. Dino Christenson
dinopc@bu.edu
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or if you have any
complaints or concerns and want to speak with someone independent of the research
team, you may contact the Boston University Charles River Campus IRB at 617-358-
6115. The IRB Office webpage has information where you can learn more about being a
participant in research, and you can also complete a Participant Feedback Survey.
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APPENDIX TWO: COMPLETE FIRST SEGMENT SURVEY QUESTIONS.
[All Workers received this segment]




Q2: What race do you identify with?
● White (1)
● Black or African American (2)
● American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
● Asian (4)
● Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
● Other (6)
Q3: What is your age?
● 18 - 24 (1)
● 25 - 34 (2)
● 35 - 44 (3)
● 45 - 54 (4)
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● 55 - 64 (5)
● 65 - 74 (6)
● 75 - 84 (7)
● 85 or older (8)
Q4: What is the highest level of education you have achieved or highest degree obtained?
● Less than high school (1)
● High school graduate (2)
● Some college (3)
● 2 year degree (4)
● 4 year degree (5)
● Professional degree (6)
● Doctorate (7)




If “Did you vote in the last election?” = Yes
Q6: Who did you vote for in the last election?
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● Donald Trump and Mike Pence (R) (1)
● Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine (D) (2)
● Gary Johnson and Bill Weld (L) (3)
● Other (4)
Q7: How would you place yourself on the following scale?
● Extremely liberal. (1)
● Liberal. (2)
● Slightly liberal. (3)
● Moderate; Center. (4)
● Slightly conservative. (5)
● Conservative. (6)
● Extremely conservative. (7)





Q9: Who are you planning on voting for in the 2020 election, if at all?
● Donald Trump and Mike Pence (R) (5)
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● Joe Biden and Kamala Harris (D) (6)
● Jo Jorgensen and Jeremy Cohen (L) (7)
● Other (8)
● Planning to not vote (9)
Display This Question:
If “Who are you planning on voting for in the 2020 election, if at all?” != Planning to not
vote.
Q10: How would you describe your preference for this candidate?
● Prefer a great deal (1)
● Prefer a lot (2)
● Prefer a moderate amount (3)
● Prefer slightly (4)
● Do not prefer (5)
Q11: Which party currently has the most members in the Senate in Washington?
(Open-End Response)
Q12: Who is the current speaker of the House?
(Open-End Response)
Q13: How many justices sit on the Supreme Court?
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(Open-End Response)
Q14: How many amendments are there to the Constitution?
(Open-End Response)
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APPENDIX THREE: COMPLETE SECOND SEGMENT SURVEY QUESTIONS
AND ADVERTISEMENTS.
Policy Topic: Labor. Donald Trump Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q15: What was the average unemployment rate in 2019, the third year of Trump’s
presidency?
(Open-End Response)
Q16: What is your final guess for the average American unemployment rate in 2019?
(Open-End Response)
Q17: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Labor. Joe Biden Advertisement.  [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q18: What was the average unemployment rate in 2019, the third year of Trump’s
presidency?
(Open-End Response)
Q19: What is your final guess for the average American unemployment rate in 2019?
(Open-End Response)
Q20: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Labor. Reuters Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this treatment]
Q21: What was the average unemployment rate in 2019, the third year of Trump’s
presidency?
(Open-End Response)
Q22: What is your final guess for the average American unemployment rate in 2019?
(Open-End Response)
Q23: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Economic. Donald Trump Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q24: How much did the United States collect in tariffs from China at the end of 2018,
Trump’s second year of presidency?  Please write your answer in number of billions, for
example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q25: What is your final guess for how much the United States collected in tariffs from
China at the end of 2018, Trump’s second year of presidency? Please write your answer
in number of billions, for example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q26: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Economic. Joe Biden Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q27: How much did the United States collect in tariffs from China at the end of 2018,
Trump’s second year of presidency?  Please write your answer in number of billions, for
example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q28: What is your final guess for how much the United States collected in tariffs from
China at the end of 2018, Trump’s second year of presidency? Please write your answer
in number of billions, for example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q29: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Economic. Reuters Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q30: How much did the United States collect in tariffs from China at the end of 2018,
Trump’s second year of presidency?  Please write your answer in number of billions, for
example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q31: What is your final guess for how much the United States collected in tariffs from
China at the end of 2018, Trump’s second year of presidency? Please write your answer
in number of billions, for example 10 billion, not 10,000,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q32: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Immigration. Donald Trump Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received
this treatment]
Q33: In 2018, the second year of Trump’s presidency, what was the number of
immigrants in the United States? Please write your answer in number of millions, for
example 10 million, not 10,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q34: What is your final guess for the number of immigrants in the United States in 2018?
(Open-End Response)
Q35: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Immigration. Joe Biden Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q36: In 2018, the second year of Trump’s presidency, what was the number of
immigrants in the United States? Please write your answer in number of millions, for
example 10 million, not 10,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q37: What is your final guess for the number of immigrants in the United States in 2018?
(Open-End Response)
Q38: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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Policy Topic: Immigration. Reuters Advertisement. [1/9 Workers received this
treatment]
Q39: In 2018, the second year of Trump’s presidency, what was the number of
immigrants in the United States? Please write your answer in number of millions, for
example 10 million, not 10,000,000.
(Open-End Response)
Q40: What is your final guess for the number of immigrants in the United States in 2018?
(Open-End Response)
Q41: Please write one sentence about how you arrived at your final guess.
(Open-End Response)
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APPENDIX FOUR: COMPLETE THIRD SEGMENT SURVEY QUESTIONS.
Q42:  Please include below your MTurk Worker ID, so that payment can be confirmed
and prompt" with "Below is a generated, random, 10 digit code. Please copy this code
into MTurk where it asks for "survey code". Thank you.
(Random number generated)
Q43: Thank you for completing this survey. Please complete the reCAPTCHA below to
help protect this survey from spam and abuse.
(Open-End Response)
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APPENDIX FIVE: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.
Table Eleven: Testing Republican Identification and Amount/Direction of Answer
Change.
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Table Twelve: Testing Democratic Identification and Amount/Direction of Answer
Change.
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Table Thirteen: Testing Partisan-Motivated Reasoning with Partisan Populations,
Magnitude Change.
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Table Fourteen: Testing Partisan-Motivated Reasoning with Partisan Populations,
Direction of Updating.
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Table Fifteen: Testing Republican Partisan Identification and Magnitude of Answer
Change with Controls.
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Table Sixteen: Testing Democratic Partisan Identification and Magnitude of Answer
Change with Controls.
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Table Seventeen: Testing Republican Partisan Identification and Amount and
Direction of Answer Change with Controls.
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Table Eighteen: Testing Democratic Partisan Identification and Amount and
Direction of Answer Change with Controls.
161
Table Twenty: Testing Republican Partisan Identification and Amount of Answer
Change with Advertisement Source and Policy Interactions.
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Table Twenty One: Testing Democratic Partisan Identification and Amount of
Answer Change with Advertisement Source and Policy Interactions.
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